Galyang Goals:

A Synopsis of the Generic Ropeway Beast

DALE LEE NAFZIGER

On 17 and 18 April, 1996, I participated in a seminar held at the Andhi Khola Hydro and Rural Electrification Project’s (AHREP) office in Galyang, Syangia, to discuss ropeways in the context of rural electrification. While listening to presentations covering a broad spectrum, I realised that although some facets of ropeways are site-specific, many characteristics are of a generic nature. Below I summarise some of these traits as well as provide my own insights with an eye toward the future of the ropeway.

A discussion of ropeways is similar to the proverbial story of six blind men describing an elephant: at a cursory glance, the treatment of ropeways seems quite straightforward, but a more intimate exploration makes it abundantly apparent that what is observed first is, in fact, only the tip of the iceberg. In order to treat the subject effectively, it is necessary to delimit it. One must ask oneself what, specifically, is being discussed: ropeways for the rural areas, ropeways for transport, ropeways for garbage disposal, ropeways that are technically feasible, ones that are economically feasible, or what? Only once the precise topic is identified can a fruitful discussion ensue.

It is, furthermore, quite futile to discuss ropeways envacuo, i.e., without regard for broader integrated rural development. There are very few examples in history of technology that is self-propagating and self-perpetuating, and the ropeway is certainly not one of them. One must consider what existing development efforts will be enhanced by the construction of a ropeway and what infrastructure needs to be added in order for that ropeway to stimulate more development. The Hero bicycle, the Usha sewing machine and the TV dish antenna aside, the successful introduction of technology in Nepal requires doing considerable homework beforehand and careful nurturing afterwards. This is particularly true in the case of the humble ropeway because its successful introduction and propagation requires overcoming a significant social bias that equates road building with development. The prejudice against ropeways becomes particularly obvious when one realises that ropeways are by no means a neglected sector in terms of planning and policy. In fact, every major political party in Nepal promotes the development of ropeways or electric transport in its party manifesto and the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth National Five–ear Plans also include provisions for ropeways under ‘other modes of transportation development’. In real terms there has been little progress beyond this hypothetical framework. In the Nepali context, it is profitable to commence our discussion of ropeways in a generic sense by considering what factors are responsible for the chasm between ropeway policy formulation and effective implementation.

One point noted in the AHREP seminar is the political economy of Nepal: political parties parade ropeways on a pedestal during times of national crises but just as conveniently wash their hands of them as soon any given crisis is averted. The promotion of the Hetauda-Kathmandu ropeway when the Trade and Transit Treaty with India lapsed in the spring of 1989 is just one example. I hasten to add that Nepal’s ‘pile of dirty laundry’ is minuscule compared to the USA’s attempts to mobilise an ‘alternative energy sector’ in response to the Middle East oil embargo in the early 1970s.

Another political-economic factor widening the gap between the formulation and effective implementation of policy is the fact that ropeways are administratively situated under the government-owned NTC within the MoWT, which is dominated by the DoR. This institutional framework stacks the odds against ropeways, which are unjustly overshadowed by their big brother, roads.

A third reason ropeway policy is not implemented is the limited number of case studies which exist. While these studies do provide evidence that ropeways can be operated effectively on a community basis, they do not demonstrate the commercial viability that attracts private investors. A colleague rightly pointed out that this is the case with just about every type of village-level infrastructure in Nepal. Perhaps what is needed to rectify this unfortunate situation is a dose of creative marketing or a re­education of potential investors. It is my observation that in Nepal investments offering quick returns but with gross long-term negative consequences are spontaneously generated, whereas environmentally friendly options are generally supported only when a financing institution sees an opportunity for promoting its name.

For example, each morning as I ride my bicycle up the Pulchok hill to the office, I face an increasing onslaught of large vehicles crowding Kathmandu’s already overburdened road network. In addition to ICIMOD and UNDP staff vehicles and school buses transporting students in firetraps with smoke belching out the back, taxis, each with the name of its respective patron finance institution painted on it in large bold letters, asphyxiate me. Clearly, organisations with cash-laden investment coffers do not lend gratuitously, as you well discover if you try to obtain financing support for just about any type of environmentally-friendly investment. Nepal’s banks operate on a different wavelength from that of sustainable development. It is no surprise, for example, that the search for partial in-country funding for the Khimti Hydropower Project was a failure. In my opinion, some very slick marketing is needed to convince Nepal’s banks that there are viable options for investment which go beyond putting more advertisement-laden taxis on the road.1

The bad press given to ropeways, whether deserved or not, also widens the gap between policy and its implementation. Allegations regarding the pilferage of materials transported via ropeways make ropeways seem unreliable. Rumours that trucking cartels have the means of actively discouraging ropeway development, whether true or not, portray ropeways negatively and scare away potential investors.

Experience in Nepal has demonstrated that not all manufacturers of ropeway equipment are created equal. In some case studies, for example, significant cost savings during the initial installation have been forfeited by even greater expenditure during operation due to the premature failure of system hardware. Furthermore, even with reliable equipment, proper repair and maintenance requires significant investments of institutional time and resources that are not always easy to make. These lessons have rendered implementation difficult.

Finally, a practical issue contributing to the gap is the substantial cost of a reliable winch machine, which has to be imported. Whether a ropeway is one-kilometre long or ten-kilometres long makes little difference to the overall cost, as the major expenditure is an essential piece of foreign equipment unlikely to be produced locally in the foreseeable future.

Given the long list of potential drawbacks, what can be argued in defence of ropeways? First, experience in Nepal has demonstrated that the cost of a ropeway is nearly always less than that of an equivalent length of motorable road. Besides, the straight-line path adhered to during ropeway design and installation means that a ropeway connecting two places is considerably shorter than any road connecting the same two places. A direct corollary of the ropeway’s shorter length is that it has fewer adverse environmental and financial impacts: expenditure of foreign hard currency is less on a ropeway than on the most competitive motorable road alternative.

A further point supporting ropeways is that there appears to be little correlation between ropeway construction and loss of employment for porters. Evidence suggests that constructing ropeways only on the most difficult stretches of any given footpath relieves drudgery for porters but does not deny them employment on easier portions of the trail.

A final point in defence of ropeways is that although some hardware must, for reliability’s sake, be imported from abroad, ropeways employ fairly simple technology. The existing national pool of technical experts should, therefore, be able to develop and implement this technology with a minimal infusion of external expertise.

Having expended considerable words on the relative merits and demerits of ropeway technology, I wish to change the topic somewhat and, looking toward the future, discuss how ropeways might be given a just hearing in the Nepali context. Earlier in this paper I touched upon a point generally accepted in development circles regarding the ‘critical mass’ of infrastructure required for any technology to be self-perpetuating. It is clear that the technology of ropeways in the Nepali context, has, by no stretch of the imagination, evolved to this point. There is, however, a fairly well-developed MHP industry in a country whose development, some contend, has stalled. It seems possible to ‘piggy back’ ropeway development onto the existing MHP industry, thus invigorating the latter and giving it a new life, in the same manner that micro-hydro did for electricity about two decades ago. I believe that such creative thinking needs to be encouraged if ropeways are ever to receive a fair trial in Nepal. Beyond considering such a conventional option, even more novel brainstorming might be appropriate. One participant at the AHREP meeting suggested, for example, that ropeways be used to transport waste out of Kathmandu. This proposal never caught on but, perhaps modified somewhat, should have.

Although creative thinking is a necessary catalyst if we are to evolve from the primordial ooze, the AHREP seminar participants agreed that beyond mental gymnastics, significant and direct stimulus is also needed to move the development of ropeways in Nepal forward. One painfully obvious constraint is that very few pilot efforts capable of providing reliable data-either positive or negative-currently exist in Nepal. More than speculation, there is a bona fide need for trials to address technical uncertainties as well as to explore innovative management methodologies. In addition to providing opportunities to debug technical and managerial glitches, such case studies would also provide conclusive cost-comparison and energy-savings data. What long-term energy savings would, for example, accrue to the nation if a ropeway such as that from Hetauda-Kathmandu were operated on a reliable basis? Speculation could fill pages, but we need facts.

In commencing novel work on ropeways, some parties will benefit and some will lose. The potential benefits of ropeways must, therefore, be sold to lobbies or cartels that initially opposed ropeway development. Resorting to bold thinking, can it be proposed that the Nepal trucker’s association be granted honorary shareholder status in any newly formed ropeway organisation? Such an audacious idea represents the type of thinking that will be necessary at the national and district levels if ropeways are to stand a fair trial.

Considerable effort in motivating locals is also required. For example, when conducting a preliminary ropeway study for AHREP a few years ago, it was necessary to dispel the threat that some merchants perceived existed. Another example of motivation involves Butawal Power Company’s efforts in the late 1980s to introduce a novel electricity tariff within the AHREP distribution area. To sell the unique facets of the project, including the tariff, a team of eight community motivators-five young men and three young women-from the surrounding villages were selected in 1988 and provided with six months of on-site training. Following the training, one of the motivators’ first tasks was to go door-to-door explaining the AHREP tariff. Their job was not easy, but I believe that they were highly influential in encouraging local people to accept electricity rates quite different from the tariff modus operandi most Nepali are familiar with. Similar motivational efforts at the national, district and local levels will be essential if ropeways in Nepal hope to ever receive a fair forum.

In summary, despite the constraints noted above, I concur with the general consensus of the seminar that ropeways do indeed appear to have a future in Nepal. At the very least they deserve a fair trial. What is needed most at this juncture is vision brought into practice through pioneering efforts or, in plain words, some visionary individuals and organisations must be willing to put scepticism on the back burner for a time and think in terms of calculated risk. Today, at least two ropeways function in Nepal-Manakamana Cable Car and Bhattedanda Milkway. Their success indicates that pioneering efforts within Nepal do exist. Only case studies can provide the firm data which demonstrate conclusively that ropeway technology is appropriate as an agent of transformation in the process of developing the country. At the end of the day, it just may be that the beast we assumed was generic, may instead be like Hanuman incarnate, back to his old job of moving the traditional Himalayan load with a slightly new technological twist.

NOTE

This observation was true partially at the time. Now with the implementation of the Piluwa Khola and Chilime hydropower projects with in-country funding, things might have changed—Editors.

Source: Ropeway in Nepal