An Engineer’s Experience with Low-cost Goods Transport in the Hills
BHOLA SHRESTHA
TECHNICAL EXUBERANCE
Kathmandu was virtually cut off from the rest of the country when, on 19 July, 1993, a disastrous cloudburst washed away several bridges and portions of the Prithvi Highway. Trucks that carried daily necessities like kerosene, salt, vegetables and petrol were stranded on the Highway. With the roads closed, the capital and its residents were practically besieged. Throughout this crisis, Nepal’s oldest ropeway continued to haul goods from Hetauda to the capital. Unlike the highways in the affected region, which had effectively been put out of commission, the ropeway had remained intact.
During this critical period, Srikrishna Upadhyaya, then a member of the National Planning Commission (NPC), called Bikash Pandey at the office of ITDG-Nepal. Upadhyaya felt that the fact that the ropeway was still functioning despite the disaster and that expensive highways had been rendered useless was proof that this was an appropriate technology that should be promoted. He suggested that ITDG-Nepal investigate the uses of ropeway technology in Nepal. At that time, I was the manager of the ITDG-Nepal’s end-use project, whose aim was to introduce new technologies that would increase the plant factor of MHP.1 When Bikash informed me about the conversation, I agreed to investigate how ropeways could be developed as end users of MHPs.
I visited Jhimruk Hydropower Plant, where Himal Hydro had built a small ropeway to haul materials to the headworks site of the plant. It was cheaper and also less damaging to the environment than an equivalent length of road. The Jhimruk Ropeway impressed me on two counts. First, the local capacity to build a material ropeway was already in existence. Second, small ropeways for transporting goods had the potential to improve rural access as well as to increase the plant factor of MHPs.1
In December 1994, Bikash Pandey and I visited Washbang, a Chepang village in northern Chitawan, to survey a MHP project. On the way, he told me that Akkal Man Nakarmi, who had made significant contributions toward promoting MHPs in the country, had an unrealised dream of developing ropeways in Nepal.2 He had picked up the idea of Peltric sets when he visited Switzerland,3 and had developed and promoted them after coming back to Nepal. Peltric sets have now become ubiquitous in the hills of Nepal.
A visit to the Alps to learn about the Swiss approach to developing ropeways seemed the next logical step. In June 1995, Akkal Man Nakarmi and I flew to Austria, where Mick Prince, who had completed his undergraduate thesis on ropeways in Nepal at the University of Warwick, UK, and Reinhold Metzler, a German engineer who had worked in Nepal and who was our escort, joined us. We spent a week driving to mountain communities in the Swiss and Austrian Alps to study and learn from the ropeways there.
During the week-long trip to the Alps, we observed a range of ropeway technologies. Many Swiss and Austrian dairy farmers operated short ropeways twice a day to carry milk to collection centres. These systems were owned and operated by individual families. They were particularly handy during the eight winter months when roads were covered in snow. Because the government provided subsidies to meet part of the cost of investment, the systems were affordable. One system we saw had been constructed in 1947 and still used by an old woman farmer. We also saw small ropeways which had been promoted over roads in the 1920’s and 1930’s as an economical alternative for transporting goods to small hilly settlements. At that time, remote communities in the Alps faced conditions similar to those Nepali villagers faced in the 1990s. After concluding that short ropeways would indeed be appropriate for Nepal, we contacted companies that manufactured ropeways and winches.
ROPEWAY INITIATIVE BY ITDG-NEPAL
At the time of our visit to Switzerland, ITDG-Nepal, as part of its collaboration with KMTNC’s ACAP efforts, had been working for a number of years with the community of Ghandruk located south of Machhapuchre in Kaski District.4 Every day, a considerable amount of cargo is transported to Ghandruk through Syauli Bazaar, which is about 800 metres below the village. For us at ITDG-Nepal, Ghandruk was an obvious site for installing a ropeway to transport goods as there was a demand and there was a 50-kW community-managed MHP to power it. After a reconnaissance survey was completed in May 1994, Mick Prince conducted a study that included a survey of European ropeway products and their prices. These investigations revealed to us that the costs of imports were very high, but that the total cost of a ropeway could be lowered if locally fabricated towers and hangers and Indian-made steel ropes were used. In fact, the more local material could be used, the lower the costs would be and the more local manufacturing would receive a boost. If too many components had to be imported, we found, the cost of installing a ropeway would be beyond the reach of a Nepali community in the hills.
In 1996, when Andrew Barnet, the technology policy director of ITDG-UK, visited Ghandruk, village leader Min Bahadur Gurung requested ITDG-Nepal to help the community install a ropeway to replace mules and donkeys, the local beasts of burden which transported goods but also that littered the trekking path to Ghandruk with their droppings. ITDG’s research on different ropeway systems and quotations from European suppliers indicated that a ropeway connecting Syauli Bazaar with Ghandruk—a distance of about four kilometres—would cost Rs 10-12 million. This amount was three times the cost of the Ghandruk MHP, which had been built in 1991 for Rs 3.5 million. An investment of this scale was not within the scope of either ITDG’s micro-hydro end-use project or the community. Besides, the ITDG-UK office viewed the proposal for a ropeway as a programme of transportation, and hence outside the purview of its organisation in Nepal, whose limited mandate was capacity building within the MHP sector.
In the meantime, Dipak Gyawali and Ajaya Dixit of Interdisciplinary Analysts (IDA), Kathmandu, had completed a study of ropeways for ITDG-Nepal in 1996. They investigated whether or not there was a future for small ropeways to transport goods in the mountains, and in their report, suggested that small ropeways do indeed have a future but only under certain political-economic and institutional conditions. If two alternative but mature industries of Nepal—the suspension bridge and the MHP industries—could be married through the ropeway industry, there would be, they concluded, a bright future for this technology. The merger would cut costs for both industries and expand their markets. These ideas were discussed with many other ropeway experts and enthusiasts at a seminar jointly sponsored by ITDG-Nepal and Butawal Power Company (BPC) in Galyang, Syanja, in mid-April 1996.
Participants were optimistic about the economic benefits accruing from goods-carrying rural ropeways although some were sceptical about institutional modalities. If it were undertaken at all, the ropeway initiative would be a transport programme rather than a MHP end-use programme. Because we lacked a mandate to work on transport and were already heavily involved in the micro-hydropower sector, ITDG-Nepal was unable to take a ropeway project on board. The ropeway initiative within ITDG-Nepal thus seemed to fizzle out in April 1996. But it was fated to end not with a sigh, but rather with a different sort of bang.
SUPPORT TO LOCAL INITIATIVE
In November 1996, Bir Bahadur called me from Barpak asking me to help him build a goods ropeway project in Barpak, itself. Bir Bahadur Ghale is the owner of the 50¬kW MHP that provides electricity to more than 600 households in the village. He has earned a name as a successful micro-hydro entrepreneur and has proven himself as a ‘can-do’ sort of young man. Although just a few years earlier, his power plant had been struck twice by lightning and the generator damaged, he remained undeterred. The generator was brought to Kathmandu for repair, and, to everyone’s surprise, the repaired unit was flown back to Barpak on a chartered helicopter flight to get the powerhouse running again quickly. With a loan of over two million rupees and its interest compounding, Bir Bahadur was facing a financial crisis. The revenue generated by the power plant was not enough to pay its operators and had to be increased. During all of Bir Bahadur’s tribulations ITDG-Nepal had maintained a long and fruitful relationship with him.
As ITDG-Nepal had supported Bir Bahadur, it had a stake in seeing the Barpak MHP succeed. Barpak MHP was the first project of its scale initiated by a private entrepreneur and ITDG-Nepal could not afford to let it fail. But Barpak MHP was a classic case of a financially weak project where significant daytime power was not being used as there was no demand for its application. As a site for a pilot end-use project, Barpak was an obvious choice. Not only was daytime power unused, the revenue from the sale of electricity for lighting and for running an agro-processing mill would not make the project solvent. The Barpak MHP had to pay off a loan of more than Rs 1.2 million with interest and Bir Bahadur needed help in increasing revenue.
In 1994, ITDG-Nepal had advised Bir Bahadur to set up a paper industry to use the daytime load of his power plant. It became a successful industry that employed 25 people, 18 of whom were women, and had buyers from Kathmandu at its doorstep. ITDG-Nepal provided him with a locally-fabricated electric digestor and advised him about how to market the product. Bir Bahadur was also ITDG’s partner in running the service-centre concept of promoting micro-hydro power in Gorkha District and his achievement by far exceeded ITDG’s targets. Bir Bahadur was dynamic, energetic and optimistic, and by this time had also gained much experience. He had proven to be a reliable partner in ITDG’s end-use project.
Bir Bahadur’s request for assistance in initiating a ropeway project in Barpak was compelling. He had already, for example, got Gottfried Rohrer, a retired Swiss ropeway company owner, to complete a survey for installing a ropeway there. Rohrer had been invited to Nepal by Akkal Man Nakarmi to investigate the possibility of building a passenger ropeway and Bir Bahadur had met him by coincidence at Akkal Man Nakarmi’s workshop. He had persuaded Rohrer to go to Barpak to inspect the site he proposed for installing a ropeway between Rangrung and Barpak. Rohrer opined that a passenger ropeway was out of question because of the high cost involved he claimed that the investment required did not match the economy of Barpak and instead recommended installing a second-hand system to transport goods from Rangrung to Barpak, the steepest stretch of the walk into Barpak. A suitable unit, if bought at an auction in Switzerland, would cost about one-fifth the cost of a new system.
Rohrer’s suggestion was behind Bir Bahadur’s repeated calls to me and his request for help in establishing a goods-carrying ropeway in Barpak. Since he had already put forth so much effort, his desire was understandable. Bir Bahadur’s initiative matched ITDG’s philosophy of helping people who, in line with Schumacher’s much-favoured quote, help themselves. Thus, several favourable factors were in place: locally available energy from an MHP; low-cost ropeway equipment; NGDG, which Bir Bahadur himself headed, and a determined young leader with a strong entrepreneurial track record. Furthermore, when completed, such a system would eliminate the burden of the five-to-six-hour walk up the steep Rangrung-Barpak stretch. Each day hundreds of women and men from Barpak and Laprak, a neighbouring village, trudged up and down this steep climb. I decided to support Bir Bahadur’s initiative even though the ropeway was outside the purview of ITDG-Nepal.
ITDG’s head office in the UK was concerned that the ropeway would displace porters, leaving them unemployed, and that the pylons (towers) would be risky in the fragile Himalayan landscape. We in the Nepal office, however, had a different perspective. Since the ropeway was to be built only along the steepest stretch of an arduous, near-vertical climb and would reduce drudgery for porters that verged on the inhumane, neither they nor mules would be adversely affected. They would still be required to carry goods from Gorkha Bazaar to Rangrung, a one-and-a-half day’s journey. Also, because the pylons were to be only six metres high, there would be no major risks.
Since the groundwork—selecting a site, conducting a preliminary survey and identifying the type of ropeway—was complete, the next steps were to carry out a detailed survey and design of civil works, to conduct a feasibility study and, most importantly, to seek financing. In December 1996, Bir Bahadur and I met the Third Secretary of the British Embassy to solicit his support for the ropeway project. When Bir Bahadur introduced his activities and showed pictures of Barpak, the MHP, the Nepali papermaking industry and the bakery, the Secretary was impressed and said he would present the idea to the Ambassador. Dipak Gyawali, Ajaya Dixit and I met the Ambassador at a reception at the British Embassy; he said the proposition was ‘interesting’ and soon after asked that a proposal be submitted within two weeks. Based on the preliminary cost estimate, I prepared a proposal on behalf of NGDG and submitted it to the Embassy. Soon after, I commissioned Himal Hydro to conduct a detailed survey and design study. A pre-investment study conducted simultaneously showed that the ropeway was financially viable and that its payback period would be eight years.5 In May 1997, the British Embassy approved funding for the Barpak ropeway project and an agreement to that effect was signed with NGDG. The equipment ordered from Switzerland arrived in Calcutta in July 1997.
In agreement with the UK office, I was to serve only as an adviser to NGDG, which would itself be primarily responsible for the project. Gradually, however, my involvement increased until it included almost all aspects of project planning and preparation. Estimating the costs of various aspects of the ropeway with Himal Hydro, coordinating the source and supply of equipment with Gottfried Rohrer, and holding various technical consultations all fell into my lap. Bir Bahadur would arrive at the ITDG-Nepal office in Kathmandu early in the morning and would stay till late in the evening as we worked together for almost six weeks. Prior to placing the order for the equipment, it was important to verify its condition. Since travelling to Switzerland would be expensive, we requested Carl Muller, one of our Kathmandu-based Swiss friends for his help. Upon his request, the Nepal-Switzerland Friendship Association got Hans Aschmann, a senior engineer who had worked in Nepal, to inspect the equipment at his personal expense. He informed us that the equipment was in perfect working condition (Annex D).
ECONOMY OF BARPAK AND THE RANGRUNG-BARPAK STRETCH
The village of Barpak, which is inhabited mostly by Ghale Gurungs, is about one-and¬a-half walking days (nearly 45 kilometres) north of Gorkha Bazaar, the nearest roadhead and the headquarters of Gorkha District
About 4,370 people live in the 786 houses of Barpak proper, which are spread across a radius of about one kilometre. Barpak is perhaps one of Nepal’s largest mountain settlements. Laprak, where another 600 Gurung houses huddle together, is three hours further uphill. More than 80 per cent of the men in Barpak work outside of the village, most in the Indian and British armies and a few in Hong Kong. Women, who remain behind, take care of homes and farms. Although a few local shops supply daily consumer goods to local people, families usually travel all the way to Gorkha Bazaar to purchase rice, edible oil, salt, sugar, kerosene, biscuits, soap and noodles at cheaper prices. Individuals carry small loads themselves, but normally it is porters who carry loads exceeding 50 kilogrammes over the two-day trail from Gorkha Bazaar to Barpak. A tentative estimate showed that, on an average, each household spends about 26 days a year travelling to Gorkha Bazaar to buy daily necessities and carrying them back to Barpak. Shopkeepers and a few wealthy households employ porters or mules to transport goods for them.6
BHOLA SHRESTHA
TECHNICAL EXUBERANCE
Kathmandu was virtually cut off from the rest of the country when, on 19 July, 1993, a disastrous cloudburst washed away several bridges and portions of the Prithvi Highway. Trucks that carried daily necessities like kerosene, salt, vegetables and petrol were stranded on the Highway. With the roads closed, the capital and its residents were practically besieged. Throughout this crisis, Nepal’s oldest ropeway continued to haul goods from Hetauda to the capital. Unlike the highways in the affected region, which had effectively been put out of commission, the ropeway had remained intact.
During this critical period, Srikrishna Upadhyaya, then a member of the National Planning Commission (NPC), called Bikash Pandey at the office of ITDG-Nepal. Upadhyaya felt that the fact that the ropeway was still functioning despite the disaster and that expensive highways had been rendered useless was proof that this was an appropriate technology that should be promoted. He suggested that ITDG-Nepal investigate the uses of ropeway technology in Nepal. At that time, I was the manager of the ITDG-Nepal’s end-use project, whose aim was to introduce new technologies that would increase the plant factor of MHP.1 When Bikash informed me about the conversation, I agreed to investigate how ropeways could be developed as end users of MHPs.
I visited Jhimruk Hydropower Plant, where Himal Hydro had built a small ropeway to haul materials to the headworks site of the plant. It was cheaper and also less damaging to the environment than an equivalent length of road. The Jhimruk Ropeway impressed me on two counts. First, the local capacity to build a material ropeway was already in existence. Second, small ropeways for transporting goods had the potential to improve rural access as well as to increase the plant factor of MHPs.1
In December 1994, Bikash Pandey and I visited Washbang, a Chepang village in northern Chitawan, to survey a MHP project. On the way, he told me that Akkal Man Nakarmi, who had made significant contributions toward promoting MHPs in the country, had an unrealised dream of developing ropeways in Nepal.2 He had picked up the idea of Peltric sets when he visited Switzerland,3 and had developed and promoted them after coming back to Nepal. Peltric sets have now become ubiquitous in the hills of Nepal.
A visit to the Alps to learn about the Swiss approach to developing ropeways seemed the next logical step. In June 1995, Akkal Man Nakarmi and I flew to Austria, where Mick Prince, who had completed his undergraduate thesis on ropeways in Nepal at the University of Warwick, UK, and Reinhold Metzler, a German engineer who had worked in Nepal and who was our escort, joined us. We spent a week driving to mountain communities in the Swiss and Austrian Alps to study and learn from the ropeways there.
During the week-long trip to the Alps, we observed a range of ropeway technologies. Many Swiss and Austrian dairy farmers operated short ropeways twice a day to carry milk to collection centres. These systems were owned and operated by individual families. They were particularly handy during the eight winter months when roads were covered in snow. Because the government provided subsidies to meet part of the cost of investment, the systems were affordable. One system we saw had been constructed in 1947 and still used by an old woman farmer. We also saw small ropeways which had been promoted over roads in the 1920’s and 1930’s as an economical alternative for transporting goods to small hilly settlements. At that time, remote communities in the Alps faced conditions similar to those Nepali villagers faced in the 1990s. After concluding that short ropeways would indeed be appropriate for Nepal, we contacted companies that manufactured ropeways and winches.
ROPEWAY INITIATIVE BY ITDG-NEPAL
At the time of our visit to Switzerland, ITDG-Nepal, as part of its collaboration with KMTNC’s ACAP efforts, had been working for a number of years with the community of Ghandruk located south of Machhapuchre in Kaski District.4 Every day, a considerable amount of cargo is transported to Ghandruk through Syauli Bazaar, which is about 800 metres below the village. For us at ITDG-Nepal, Ghandruk was an obvious site for installing a ropeway to transport goods as there was a demand and there was a 50-kW community-managed MHP to power it. After a reconnaissance survey was completed in May 1994, Mick Prince conducted a study that included a survey of European ropeway products and their prices. These investigations revealed to us that the costs of imports were very high, but that the total cost of a ropeway could be lowered if locally fabricated towers and hangers and Indian-made steel ropes were used. In fact, the more local material could be used, the lower the costs would be and the more local manufacturing would receive a boost. If too many components had to be imported, we found, the cost of installing a ropeway would be beyond the reach of a Nepali community in the hills.
In 1996, when Andrew Barnet, the technology policy director of ITDG-UK, visited Ghandruk, village leader Min Bahadur Gurung requested ITDG-Nepal to help the community install a ropeway to replace mules and donkeys, the local beasts of burden which transported goods but also that littered the trekking path to Ghandruk with their droppings. ITDG’s research on different ropeway systems and quotations from European suppliers indicated that a ropeway connecting Syauli Bazaar with Ghandruk—a distance of about four kilometres—would cost Rs 10-12 million. This amount was three times the cost of the Ghandruk MHP, which had been built in 1991 for Rs 3.5 million. An investment of this scale was not within the scope of either ITDG’s micro-hydro end-use project or the community. Besides, the ITDG-UK office viewed the proposal for a ropeway as a programme of transportation, and hence outside the purview of its organisation in Nepal, whose limited mandate was capacity building within the MHP sector.
In the meantime, Dipak Gyawali and Ajaya Dixit of Interdisciplinary Analysts (IDA), Kathmandu, had completed a study of ropeways for ITDG-Nepal in 1996. They investigated whether or not there was a future for small ropeways to transport goods in the mountains, and in their report, suggested that small ropeways do indeed have a future but only under certain political-economic and institutional conditions. If two alternative but mature industries of Nepal—the suspension bridge and the MHP industries—could be married through the ropeway industry, there would be, they concluded, a bright future for this technology. The merger would cut costs for both industries and expand their markets. These ideas were discussed with many other ropeway experts and enthusiasts at a seminar jointly sponsored by ITDG-Nepal and Butawal Power Company (BPC) in Galyang, Syanja, in mid-April 1996.
Participants were optimistic about the economic benefits accruing from goods-carrying rural ropeways although some were sceptical about institutional modalities. If it were undertaken at all, the ropeway initiative would be a transport programme rather than a MHP end-use programme. Because we lacked a mandate to work on transport and were already heavily involved in the micro-hydropower sector, ITDG-Nepal was unable to take a ropeway project on board. The ropeway initiative within ITDG-Nepal thus seemed to fizzle out in April 1996. But it was fated to end not with a sigh, but rather with a different sort of bang.
SUPPORT TO LOCAL INITIATIVE
In November 1996, Bir Bahadur called me from Barpak asking me to help him build a goods ropeway project in Barpak, itself. Bir Bahadur Ghale is the owner of the 50¬kW MHP that provides electricity to more than 600 households in the village. He has earned a name as a successful micro-hydro entrepreneur and has proven himself as a ‘can-do’ sort of young man. Although just a few years earlier, his power plant had been struck twice by lightning and the generator damaged, he remained undeterred. The generator was brought to Kathmandu for repair, and, to everyone’s surprise, the repaired unit was flown back to Barpak on a chartered helicopter flight to get the powerhouse running again quickly. With a loan of over two million rupees and its interest compounding, Bir Bahadur was facing a financial crisis. The revenue generated by the power plant was not enough to pay its operators and had to be increased. During all of Bir Bahadur’s tribulations ITDG-Nepal had maintained a long and fruitful relationship with him.
As ITDG-Nepal had supported Bir Bahadur, it had a stake in seeing the Barpak MHP succeed. Barpak MHP was the first project of its scale initiated by a private entrepreneur and ITDG-Nepal could not afford to let it fail. But Barpak MHP was a classic case of a financially weak project where significant daytime power was not being used as there was no demand for its application. As a site for a pilot end-use project, Barpak was an obvious choice. Not only was daytime power unused, the revenue from the sale of electricity for lighting and for running an agro-processing mill would not make the project solvent. The Barpak MHP had to pay off a loan of more than Rs 1.2 million with interest and Bir Bahadur needed help in increasing revenue.
In 1994, ITDG-Nepal had advised Bir Bahadur to set up a paper industry to use the daytime load of his power plant. It became a successful industry that employed 25 people, 18 of whom were women, and had buyers from Kathmandu at its doorstep. ITDG-Nepal provided him with a locally-fabricated electric digestor and advised him about how to market the product. Bir Bahadur was also ITDG’s partner in running the service-centre concept of promoting micro-hydro power in Gorkha District and his achievement by far exceeded ITDG’s targets. Bir Bahadur was dynamic, energetic and optimistic, and by this time had also gained much experience. He had proven to be a reliable partner in ITDG’s end-use project.
Bir Bahadur’s request for assistance in initiating a ropeway project in Barpak was compelling. He had already, for example, got Gottfried Rohrer, a retired Swiss ropeway company owner, to complete a survey for installing a ropeway there. Rohrer had been invited to Nepal by Akkal Man Nakarmi to investigate the possibility of building a passenger ropeway and Bir Bahadur had met him by coincidence at Akkal Man Nakarmi’s workshop. He had persuaded Rohrer to go to Barpak to inspect the site he proposed for installing a ropeway between Rangrung and Barpak. Rohrer opined that a passenger ropeway was out of question because of the high cost involved he claimed that the investment required did not match the economy of Barpak and instead recommended installing a second-hand system to transport goods from Rangrung to Barpak, the steepest stretch of the walk into Barpak. A suitable unit, if bought at an auction in Switzerland, would cost about one-fifth the cost of a new system.
Rohrer’s suggestion was behind Bir Bahadur’s repeated calls to me and his request for help in establishing a goods-carrying ropeway in Barpak. Since he had already put forth so much effort, his desire was understandable. Bir Bahadur’s initiative matched ITDG’s philosophy of helping people who, in line with Schumacher’s much-favoured quote, help themselves. Thus, several favourable factors were in place: locally available energy from an MHP; low-cost ropeway equipment; NGDG, which Bir Bahadur himself headed, and a determined young leader with a strong entrepreneurial track record. Furthermore, when completed, such a system would eliminate the burden of the five-to-six-hour walk up the steep Rangrung-Barpak stretch. Each day hundreds of women and men from Barpak and Laprak, a neighbouring village, trudged up and down this steep climb. I decided to support Bir Bahadur’s initiative even though the ropeway was outside the purview of ITDG-Nepal.
ITDG’s head office in the UK was concerned that the ropeway would displace porters, leaving them unemployed, and that the pylons (towers) would be risky in the fragile Himalayan landscape. We in the Nepal office, however, had a different perspective. Since the ropeway was to be built only along the steepest stretch of an arduous, near-vertical climb and would reduce drudgery for porters that verged on the inhumane, neither they nor mules would be adversely affected. They would still be required to carry goods from Gorkha Bazaar to Rangrung, a one-and-a-half day’s journey. Also, because the pylons were to be only six metres high, there would be no major risks.
Since the groundwork—selecting a site, conducting a preliminary survey and identifying the type of ropeway—was complete, the next steps were to carry out a detailed survey and design of civil works, to conduct a feasibility study and, most importantly, to seek financing. In December 1996, Bir Bahadur and I met the Third Secretary of the British Embassy to solicit his support for the ropeway project. When Bir Bahadur introduced his activities and showed pictures of Barpak, the MHP, the Nepali papermaking industry and the bakery, the Secretary was impressed and said he would present the idea to the Ambassador. Dipak Gyawali, Ajaya Dixit and I met the Ambassador at a reception at the British Embassy; he said the proposition was ‘interesting’ and soon after asked that a proposal be submitted within two weeks. Based on the preliminary cost estimate, I prepared a proposal on behalf of NGDG and submitted it to the Embassy. Soon after, I commissioned Himal Hydro to conduct a detailed survey and design study. A pre-investment study conducted simultaneously showed that the ropeway was financially viable and that its payback period would be eight years.5 In May 1997, the British Embassy approved funding for the Barpak ropeway project and an agreement to that effect was signed with NGDG. The equipment ordered from Switzerland arrived in Calcutta in July 1997.
In agreement with the UK office, I was to serve only as an adviser to NGDG, which would itself be primarily responsible for the project. Gradually, however, my involvement increased until it included almost all aspects of project planning and preparation. Estimating the costs of various aspects of the ropeway with Himal Hydro, coordinating the source and supply of equipment with Gottfried Rohrer, and holding various technical consultations all fell into my lap. Bir Bahadur would arrive at the ITDG-Nepal office in Kathmandu early in the morning and would stay till late in the evening as we worked together for almost six weeks. Prior to placing the order for the equipment, it was important to verify its condition. Since travelling to Switzerland would be expensive, we requested Carl Muller, one of our Kathmandu-based Swiss friends for his help. Upon his request, the Nepal-Switzerland Friendship Association got Hans Aschmann, a senior engineer who had worked in Nepal, to inspect the equipment at his personal expense. He informed us that the equipment was in perfect working condition (Annex D).
ECONOMY OF BARPAK AND THE RANGRUNG-BARPAK STRETCH
The village of Barpak, which is inhabited mostly by Ghale Gurungs, is about one-and¬a-half walking days (nearly 45 kilometres) north of Gorkha Bazaar, the nearest roadhead and the headquarters of Gorkha District
About 4,370 people live in the 786 houses of Barpak proper, which are spread across a radius of about one kilometre. Barpak is perhaps one of Nepal’s largest mountain settlements. Laprak, where another 600 Gurung houses huddle together, is three hours further uphill. More than 80 per cent of the men in Barpak work outside of the village, most in the Indian and British armies and a few in Hong Kong. Women, who remain behind, take care of homes and farms. Although a few local shops supply daily consumer goods to local people, families usually travel all the way to Gorkha Bazaar to purchase rice, edible oil, salt, sugar, kerosene, biscuits, soap and noodles at cheaper prices. Individuals carry small loads themselves, but normally it is porters who carry loads exceeding 50 kilogrammes over the two-day trail from Gorkha Bazaar to Barpak. A tentative estimate showed that, on an average, each household spends about 26 days a year travelling to Gorkha Bazaar to buy daily necessities and carrying them back to Barpak. Shopkeepers and a few wealthy households employ porters or mules to transport goods for them.6
The local economy is dependent on subsistence agriculture but Barpak is a food-deficient village. Only one-third of the households produce sufficient food to last for a year; the rest meet their needs with imports from Gorkha. In fact, one estimate showed that 1,200 tonnes of goods are carried from Gorkha to Barpak each year (Poudel, 1997). Except for potato seeds from Laprak, local exports to Gorkha are insignificant. Rice and wheat are grown in the flood plains of the Daraundi River below Barpak. Crops cultivated in the flood plain of Daraundi, where many households of Barpak own land, is carried up to the village by family members.
The Rangrung to Barpak stretch is the hardest and the most gruelling of the two-day walk. The steep 1000-metre hill takes five to six hours to climb. In contrast, the trail from Gorkha along the Daraundi River is relatively flat although it occasionally passes along over small ridges. We found that the people were delighted by the proposal to install a ropeway along the Rangrung-Barpak stretch. Barpak was an obvious choice for a goods-carrying ropeway.
While a gravel road from Gorkha was due to reach Baluwa (near Rangrung) in a few years, there were no plans to build a road from Rangrung to Barpak. Even if a plan were made, it would cost about Rs 24 million to build a road. The proposed ropeway would be four times cheaper (Table 10.1) and would have minimal environmental impacts during and after installation. The ropeway would also increase the plant factor of the Barpak MHP. Constructing a ropeway system between Rangrung and Barpak seemed the right thing to do.
SHARING RESPONSIBILITY
The parties sharing the responsibility for planning and implementing the community ropeway project operated along sectoral lines. NGDG was responsible for providing all unskilled labour and local materials worth 10 per cent of the total cost; ITDG-Nepal served as an intermediary support organisation for project preparation, planning and management support; Gottfried Rohrer of Planug Realisation supplied equipment, provided technical advice, oversaw erection ,7 and tested and commissioned electromechanical equipment. Finally, Himal Hydro was responsible for the survey, design and supervision of civil works construction. Of the total cost of the project (Rs 6,407,000), the British Embassy in Kathmandu provided Rs 4,646,895.
After it completed the detailed survey and design, Himal Hydro had two options regarding its role in the civil construction works on site. The first possibility was to supervise the construction of civil works, which entailed providing three skilled staff members on site under the supervision of an engineer, in order to help NGDG carry
The Rangrung to Barpak stretch is the hardest and the most gruelling of the two-day walk. The steep 1000-metre hill takes five to six hours to climb. In contrast, the trail from Gorkha along the Daraundi River is relatively flat although it occasionally passes along over small ridges. We found that the people were delighted by the proposal to install a ropeway along the Rangrung-Barpak stretch. Barpak was an obvious choice for a goods-carrying ropeway.
While a gravel road from Gorkha was due to reach Baluwa (near Rangrung) in a few years, there were no plans to build a road from Rangrung to Barpak. Even if a plan were made, it would cost about Rs 24 million to build a road. The proposed ropeway would be four times cheaper (Table 10.1) and would have minimal environmental impacts during and after installation. The ropeway would also increase the plant factor of the Barpak MHP. Constructing a ropeway system between Rangrung and Barpak seemed the right thing to do.
SHARING RESPONSIBILITY
The parties sharing the responsibility for planning and implementing the community ropeway project operated along sectoral lines. NGDG was responsible for providing all unskilled labour and local materials worth 10 per cent of the total cost; ITDG-Nepal served as an intermediary support organisation for project preparation, planning and management support; Gottfried Rohrer of Planug Realisation supplied equipment, provided technical advice, oversaw erection ,7 and tested and commissioned electromechanical equipment. Finally, Himal Hydro was responsible for the survey, design and supervision of civil works construction. Of the total cost of the project (Rs 6,407,000), the British Embassy in Kathmandu provided Rs 4,646,895.
After it completed the detailed survey and design, Himal Hydro had two options regarding its role in the civil construction works on site. The first possibility was to supervise the construction of civil works, which entailed providing three skilled staff members on site under the supervision of an engineer, in order to help NGDG carry
* At eight kilometres times Rs 3 million per kilometre, the rate for green roads in the hills.
out civil construction works. The second option was that Himal Hydro directly construct all civil works with materials supplied by NGDG. The cost of the latter proposal was twice that of the first option, but I, as an engineer, favoured it, since this was a novel enterprise and it was important to have a highly experienced contractor to do a good job. NGDG and Bir Bahadur, however, chose the first option over my objections. With hindsight, I can say that many of the problems we encountered during construction would have been avoided had we let Himal Hydro do the job; but, at the same time, the community would have missed out on a key learning experience.
COMMISSIONING, IMMEDIATE BENEFITS AND DISASTER
The Barpak Ropeway, which was completed at a cost of Rs 6.4 million (Table 10.2), was commissioned on 8 February, 1998, and inaugurated by British Ambassador Barnaby Smith on 3 March, 1998. Soon after it came into operation, a Ropeway Management Committee (RMC) was formed with Deo Bahadur Ghale, a member of NGDG and the individual in charge of the construction of the Rangrung return-station, as the chairperson. The committee had representatives from the VDC and the local community, including one woman. Three operators and a manager were employed to manage day-to-day operations. The Ropeway made an average of 20 trips a day, hauling about three tonnes of goods to Barpak from 10 AM to 5 PM, and generated an average daily gross income of Rs 1,500. The cargo hauled and income generated
out civil construction works. The second option was that Himal Hydro directly construct all civil works with materials supplied by NGDG. The cost of the latter proposal was twice that of the first option, but I, as an engineer, favoured it, since this was a novel enterprise and it was important to have a highly experienced contractor to do a good job. NGDG and Bir Bahadur, however, chose the first option over my objections. With hindsight, I can say that many of the problems we encountered during construction would have been avoided had we let Himal Hydro do the job; but, at the same time, the community would have missed out on a key learning experience.
COMMISSIONING, IMMEDIATE BENEFITS AND DISASTER
The Barpak Ropeway, which was completed at a cost of Rs 6.4 million (Table 10.2), was commissioned on 8 February, 1998, and inaugurated by British Ambassador Barnaby Smith on 3 March, 1998. Soon after it came into operation, a Ropeway Management Committee (RMC) was formed with Deo Bahadur Ghale, a member of NGDG and the individual in charge of the construction of the Rangrung return-station, as the chairperson. The committee had representatives from the VDC and the local community, including one woman. Three operators and a manager were employed to manage day-to-day operations. The Ropeway made an average of 20 trips a day, hauling about three tonnes of goods to Barpak from 10 AM to 5 PM, and generated an average daily gross income of Rs 1,500. The cargo hauled and income generated
Description of cost Amount Rs (103)
Route survey and design, construction, supervision of civil works, tower 541
erection, stringing of cable management and coordination during construction Second-hand ZP-300 Swiss Army ropeway equipment, shipment from
1,008
Switzerland to Calcutta, additional cable from Spain and shipping Modification of petrol engine to accomodate electric motor
407 Material for civil works (500 bags of cement, six towers and cable shoes, 550
six sets of stay wires and rods, reinforcement bars) Erection of transmission line 155 Construction tools and equipment 187 Land, preliminary preparation (forest clearance), local materials, unskilled labour 555 Transportation 1,182 Training of operators 22 Erection by Swiss engineer (fee and travel allowance)
1000 Management and administration 200 Contingency 600 Total 6,407
by the ropeway is shown in Table 10.3. The operation of the Ropeway reduced the time spent hauling goods from five to six hours on foot to just 15 minutes. Walking without a load on this section saved sweat, hardship and about five hours. At the rate of Rs 0.5 per kilogramme (compared to the other least expensive options of Rs 2.30 per kilogramme by mule and Rs 3 per kilogramme by porter)8, ropeway users received a fair deal.
Though it was too early to quantify the ropeway’s benefits, studies showed that drudgery had been reduced, the prices of essentials had dropped and that porters had not, as some had feared, lost their livelihoods. In addition, new economic activities had sprung up and the energy of the MHP was more fully utilised.9 About 800 households in Barpak VDC, 600 households in Laprak and a few households in the village of Gumda and beyond—a combined population of over 8,000 people were served by the ropeway. Some 40 per cent of the goods transported belonged to the people of Laprak.
The people of Barpak and Laprak reported that the ropeway reduced drudgery and saved more than a day in commuting to Gorkha and back. Hence, they were pleased with it. The fear that porters would have no work was unjustified. In fact, the increase in the volume of goods reaching Barpak actually generated more work for porters, but reduced the inhumane hardship they had to bear on the five-hour uphill climb to Barpak. Overall, the monthly income of porters rose and the prices of daily commodities fell as more goods were made more easily available in Barpak shops (NGDG, 1998). Bir Bahadur eventually fixed the tariff of the Barpak Ropeway at Rs 0.5 per kilogramme although the initially proposed tariff was Rs 1 per kilogramme.
Route survey and design, construction, supervision of civil works, tower 541
erection, stringing of cable management and coordination during construction Second-hand ZP-300 Swiss Army ropeway equipment, shipment from
1,008
Switzerland to Calcutta, additional cable from Spain and shipping Modification of petrol engine to accomodate electric motor
407 Material for civil works (500 bags of cement, six towers and cable shoes, 550
six sets of stay wires and rods, reinforcement bars) Erection of transmission line 155 Construction tools and equipment 187 Land, preliminary preparation (forest clearance), local materials, unskilled labour 555 Transportation 1,182 Training of operators 22 Erection by Swiss engineer (fee and travel allowance)
1000 Management and administration 200 Contingency 600 Total 6,407
by the ropeway is shown in Table 10.3. The operation of the Ropeway reduced the time spent hauling goods from five to six hours on foot to just 15 minutes. Walking without a load on this section saved sweat, hardship and about five hours. At the rate of Rs 0.5 per kilogramme (compared to the other least expensive options of Rs 2.30 per kilogramme by mule and Rs 3 per kilogramme by porter)8, ropeway users received a fair deal.
Though it was too early to quantify the ropeway’s benefits, studies showed that drudgery had been reduced, the prices of essentials had dropped and that porters had not, as some had feared, lost their livelihoods. In addition, new economic activities had sprung up and the energy of the MHP was more fully utilised.9 About 800 households in Barpak VDC, 600 households in Laprak and a few households in the village of Gumda and beyond—a combined population of over 8,000 people were served by the ropeway. Some 40 per cent of the goods transported belonged to the people of Laprak.
The people of Barpak and Laprak reported that the ropeway reduced drudgery and saved more than a day in commuting to Gorkha and back. Hence, they were pleased with it. The fear that porters would have no work was unjustified. In fact, the increase in the volume of goods reaching Barpak actually generated more work for porters, but reduced the inhumane hardship they had to bear on the five-hour uphill climb to Barpak. Overall, the monthly income of porters rose and the prices of daily commodities fell as more goods were made more easily available in Barpak shops (NGDG, 1998). Bir Bahadur eventually fixed the tariff of the Barpak Ropeway at Rs 0.5 per kilogramme although the initially proposed tariff was Rs 1 per kilogramme.
Source: Earth Consult (2000) and Bir Bahadur Ghale (personal communication)
Villagers found the rate fair since it was the equivalent of carrying a 40-kilogramme load up a steep slope for five hours for Rs 20. More houses were constructed in Barpak because transporting sand and boulders from the Daraundi River and cement from Gorkha Bazaar became easier. In our original study we had not predicted that sand for construction would become a major item of demand. The villagers of Laprak used to carry potatoes to sell in Gorkha Bazaar during the summer; the ropeway made this journey much easier. Some people, like Deo Bahadur, were inspired by easy transportation and introduced sugarcane planting in Rangrung. The harvest was good and was brought to Barpak by ropeway to be sold at Rs 5 per cane. On-the-job experience in planning and organising various components of the project with partners such as ITDG-Nepal and Himal Hydro enhanced the confidence of NGDG members. Local people acquired skills in concrete work, bar bending, tower erection and cable stringing. In addition, the Swiss erector trained three local people to operate and maintain the ropeway.
Transporting about 40 tonnes of construction goods and construction activities during the implementation of the project generated local employment. The ropeway employed six staff members—a manager to handle cash, maintain books, and keep records of the goods transported; two operators; and three persons to load and unload goods and carry out weekly maintenance. The management and operation of the ropeway was the responsibility of the RMC, whose members were nominated through the village assembly. The RMC consisted of two members each from NGDG,10 the VDC, a women’s group, the poor section of the community, shareholders and a group of elders.
There were plans to train the RMC members and help them grow. ITDG-Nepal offered to provide support for the training and building capacity of the RMC, but for some reason NGDG did not seem excited by the suggestion. Support was provided to help formalise the RMC and work out how it could function effectively. We did not, however, have enough time to predict how successful the RMC would be in managing the ropeway before disaster struck in the summer of 1999, from which point the ropeway operation came to a halt after fifteen months of commercial operation.
In a review in 2000, ITDG-Nepal judged the main cause of failure to be ‘poor operation and maintenance’. As if this accident and death in May due to human negligence was not enough, in June 1999 the Rangrung Khola catchment experienced a cloudburst which resulted in a flood that completely washed away the return station on the river’s left bank. The report’s conclusion stated: ‘The high intensity rainfall had created debris flow in the Rangrung Khola which undermined the old alluvial fan of the stream and damaged the lower station’.
The local people had not seen a flood of such magnitude in 50 years. In hindsight, locating the return station at the same level as the Rangrung Khola’s suspension bridge would have been safer. The upper drive station, however, was safe though it was located near an old landslide which could have rendered it unstable. Old and new landslides seen at the site of the upper station carried with them future risks.11
UNFORESEEN DIFFICULTIES
The implementation of a novel venture such as a community-operated goods-carrying ropeway in an area that had never seen such technology resulted in many unforeseen problems, some of which are discussed below.
Power shortage: The problem of the shortage of power came to ITDG-Nepal’s notice only in August 1997 after the ropeway equipment had already arrived in Calcutta. Although the installed capacity of the Barpak MHP was 50 kW, actual generation was much lower. According to Bir Bahadur, it ranged between 36 and 43 kW, depending on the availability of water. In August 1997 ITDG-Nepal confirmed that it was even less than this, which meant that operating the ropeway with the existing daytime load would be problematic.
As the existing power output was already overstretched, Bir Bahadur had planned, even before the idea of the ropeway was introduced, to build a second 28¬kW plant using the tail water from the existing plant. He had promised that the new plant would be built before the ropeway was installed, but it was not. The second plant was to use a PVC pipe imported from India but it was not supplied on time either.
The reason for low power output was that only one turbine jet was operational. Opening the second jet caused the generator to vibrate because the connection between the generator and its base frame was makeshift. ITDG-Nepal recommended replacing it with a sound base so that both jets could be operated and full power generated. It only came to ITDG-Nepal’s notice in November that the owner had followed a different plan and shifted the plant to a site three metres down the river. Work on the generator took place when the Swiss erector was in the village to install the ropeway. The owner used the same makeshift connection and, although power output increased by a small margin, the vibration was not permanently eliminated. These problems with the generator diverted focus from and disrupted ropeway erection activities and required the Swiss expert to make an additional, expensive return trip.
The ropeway used daytime power as it operated continuously from 10 AM to 5 PM. The ropeway motor consumed 12 kW once it was running (and about 18 kW to start up). This new demand significantly increased the plant factor—over its capacity, in fact. Since the plant produced only about 30 kW and supplying power to the ropeway cut, the supply of power to households and other small enterprises, including the bakery, during the day. Only a mill and households in Ward No. 7 received electricity. The supply and demand relationship became unsatisfactory. Although the ropeway had been installed on the condition that the MHP owner would build a second plant so that sufficient power would be available, Bir Bahadur was unable to do so.
Technological: Problems with the line design led to insufficient tension in the cable, which, in turn, resulted in the reduction of its carrying capacity from 300 to just 150 kilogrammes. Consequently, the performance and resultant income from the ropeway declined. Another challenge was the location of the drive station in an area with unstable slopes. After a geo-technical investigation of the drive station area commissioned by ITDG-Nepal, it was recommended that NGDG take slope stabilisation measures before the onset of the monsoon. These measures included improving the drainage on the sidewall and providing gabion support below the drive station; the measures were not, however, implemented. The RMC did participate, but either its members did not understand how urgent these steps were we failed to impress upon them their responsibility. Thus, neither RMC nor NGDG took action when major funding was on offer from the British Embassy. Because the RMC did not mobilise the local contributions upon which support was conditional it received no money.
The plan to upgrade the payload capacity of the system by increasing the height of the cable did not take place for the same reason. When Gottfried Rohrer viewed Barpak Ropeway in early 1999 he was perturbed to find that the operating conditions were poor. 12 The hauling cable was completely dry because lubricant had not been applied for a long time and the cable touched the ground at one point. He attributed these lapses to negligence on the part of the management. As soon as this information was received, at ITDG’s initiative, a meeting was held at ITDG-Nepal’s Kathmandu office with key persons of the RMC in order to address the problems that Rohrer had identified. A work plan was prepared and responsibility divided, but the committee members did not follow up on their responsibilities. Since ITDG-Nepal did not own the Barpak Ropeway and only served in an advisory capacity, it withdrew from engagement with the ropeway venture shortly thereafter.
Managerial: Poor management and coordination during construction led to delays. NGDG was not able to provide the 10 per cent of the total costs in the form of local contributions in kind (local materials and labour) that it had committed itself to. It could only manage to contribute about three per cent. NGDG was relying totally on paid labour when I reached Barpak in December 1997. I persuaded Bir Bahadur to raise additional cash. With his salesmanship skills he raised about Rs 400,000 for further investment in the project, most of it remittances from overseas Barpakis.
Though it was made clear that the ropeway was not meant for people and a signboard at the driving stations declared that the movement of people was prohibited, Barpak Ropeway was, in fact, used as a passenger ropeway. The management could not stop people from travelling on the ropeway and even fixed the price at one rupee per kilogramme of body weight. On 7 May, 1999, the hauling rope of the ropeway snapped and four people travelling on the ropeway were killed.
REFLECTING ON THE EXPERIENCE
This ropeway was a pilot venture from which lessons must be drawn so that future efforts in this direction are more sustainable. Many organisations and individuals supported the ropeway; but many of the assumptions and values of these well-meaning supporters demand review and reassessment.13 They include: the cost-reducing approach favoured by many technical NGOs such as ITDG-Nepal; management difficulties characteristic of a society unused to this new technology; and issues of coordination among development partners. The experience at Barpak provides an opportunity to openly assess successes and failures.
Drudgery reduction: The Rangrung to Barpak was stretch a suitable site. Barpak is a large mountain village with a populated hinterland which provided sufficient demand. In one day as many as 28 trips were made. The ropeway was an effective end-use of the MHP. It demonstrated the best use of electric power: saving about 450 hours of labour each day using only 12 kW.14 However, the actual condition of the power plant needed a more thorough appraisal.
Appropriate technology: Building a road would have cost Rs 24 million and agricultural land would have been lost. In addition, it would have increased reliance on imported diesel and contributed to pollution. The environmental consequences due to landslides would have made maintenance very costly. A ropeway, in contrast, is cheap to maintain and environmentally friendly; besides, it uses locally-generated electricity. This, of course, is true in theory: in practice, inculcating a proper maintenance culture in a community, which has never used such an artefact, is the equivalent of a project by itself. Promoters of ropeways need to be aware of this painful reality.
Cost reduction: To reduce costs, a reliable second-hand ropeway system in good condition was procured, the involvement of expatriate experts minimised, a local construction contractor employed, locally-built pylons used and the community involved. The complete 2.5-kilometre ropeway system with six pylons weighing about 10 tonnes cost one million rupees. Four pylons were fabricated locally as per the original sample and additional cable was purchased from Spain. Unfortunately, cost minimising measures can sometimes result in compromises that can revisit the project later and increase its overall cost. This happened in Barpak with civil works and transportation.
Communications: Good communication among working partners is important. All was fine until August 1997, when work on site began and communication gaps developed. After much effort these gaps were repaired and the revised target met. One serious consequence of this communication gap involved power production.15 The plant owner was the main person in the community responsible for coordinating with Himal Hydro, the Swiss erector and ITDG-Nepal; but the fact that his attention was divided between the powerhouse and the ropeway had a detrimental effect on project coordination. Until the short-haul ropeway industry in Nepal grows more mature and until wider usage of ropeways in rural Nepal gives birth to more local experience in a wide range of areas, pilot projects should not substitute a novice user group for an experienced, full-time manager.
Field implementation: The absence of clear coordination increased costs. The guide wire locations had to be relocated as they were inadvertently erected in the wrong places. Similarly, cost increased because, after landslides undermined initial efforts, more concrete work was needed to accommodate the drive station in two different sites. In the field, poor progress in civil construction and the relocation of the powerhouse at the time of the Swiss erector’s visit hampered installation. His visit itself had to be organised twice as the required preparation during his first visit was far from adequate. Ten helicopter trips instead of five were required to carry the cable drums from Gorkha to Barpak because only low capacity helicopters were available. Himal Hydro, a regular client of helicopter companies, subsequently said they could easily have negotiated a better price if NGDG had asked for assistance.
Skills transfer and capacity building: Even though Himal Hydro is an experienced company, it was its first experience working on a community project in a remote area. Himal Hydro depended on the local community for its unskilled workforc, and transferring basic construction skills to the community turned out to be a more complex task than it had envisaged.
LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
While it functioned till May, 1999, the Barpak Ropeway served the mountain settlement well: it reduced drudgery and saved time. It also diversified the enduse of the Barpak MHP and improved its plant factor. It also provided very limited local employment. Finally, the experience at Barpak provided many lessons, some of which are:
Villagers found the rate fair since it was the equivalent of carrying a 40-kilogramme load up a steep slope for five hours for Rs 20. More houses were constructed in Barpak because transporting sand and boulders from the Daraundi River and cement from Gorkha Bazaar became easier. In our original study we had not predicted that sand for construction would become a major item of demand. The villagers of Laprak used to carry potatoes to sell in Gorkha Bazaar during the summer; the ropeway made this journey much easier. Some people, like Deo Bahadur, were inspired by easy transportation and introduced sugarcane planting in Rangrung. The harvest was good and was brought to Barpak by ropeway to be sold at Rs 5 per cane. On-the-job experience in planning and organising various components of the project with partners such as ITDG-Nepal and Himal Hydro enhanced the confidence of NGDG members. Local people acquired skills in concrete work, bar bending, tower erection and cable stringing. In addition, the Swiss erector trained three local people to operate and maintain the ropeway.
Transporting about 40 tonnes of construction goods and construction activities during the implementation of the project generated local employment. The ropeway employed six staff members—a manager to handle cash, maintain books, and keep records of the goods transported; two operators; and three persons to load and unload goods and carry out weekly maintenance. The management and operation of the ropeway was the responsibility of the RMC, whose members were nominated through the village assembly. The RMC consisted of two members each from NGDG,10 the VDC, a women’s group, the poor section of the community, shareholders and a group of elders.
There were plans to train the RMC members and help them grow. ITDG-Nepal offered to provide support for the training and building capacity of the RMC, but for some reason NGDG did not seem excited by the suggestion. Support was provided to help formalise the RMC and work out how it could function effectively. We did not, however, have enough time to predict how successful the RMC would be in managing the ropeway before disaster struck in the summer of 1999, from which point the ropeway operation came to a halt after fifteen months of commercial operation.
In a review in 2000, ITDG-Nepal judged the main cause of failure to be ‘poor operation and maintenance’. As if this accident and death in May due to human negligence was not enough, in June 1999 the Rangrung Khola catchment experienced a cloudburst which resulted in a flood that completely washed away the return station on the river’s left bank. The report’s conclusion stated: ‘The high intensity rainfall had created debris flow in the Rangrung Khola which undermined the old alluvial fan of the stream and damaged the lower station’.
The local people had not seen a flood of such magnitude in 50 years. In hindsight, locating the return station at the same level as the Rangrung Khola’s suspension bridge would have been safer. The upper drive station, however, was safe though it was located near an old landslide which could have rendered it unstable. Old and new landslides seen at the site of the upper station carried with them future risks.11
UNFORESEEN DIFFICULTIES
The implementation of a novel venture such as a community-operated goods-carrying ropeway in an area that had never seen such technology resulted in many unforeseen problems, some of which are discussed below.
Power shortage: The problem of the shortage of power came to ITDG-Nepal’s notice only in August 1997 after the ropeway equipment had already arrived in Calcutta. Although the installed capacity of the Barpak MHP was 50 kW, actual generation was much lower. According to Bir Bahadur, it ranged between 36 and 43 kW, depending on the availability of water. In August 1997 ITDG-Nepal confirmed that it was even less than this, which meant that operating the ropeway with the existing daytime load would be problematic.
As the existing power output was already overstretched, Bir Bahadur had planned, even before the idea of the ropeway was introduced, to build a second 28¬kW plant using the tail water from the existing plant. He had promised that the new plant would be built before the ropeway was installed, but it was not. The second plant was to use a PVC pipe imported from India but it was not supplied on time either.
The reason for low power output was that only one turbine jet was operational. Opening the second jet caused the generator to vibrate because the connection between the generator and its base frame was makeshift. ITDG-Nepal recommended replacing it with a sound base so that both jets could be operated and full power generated. It only came to ITDG-Nepal’s notice in November that the owner had followed a different plan and shifted the plant to a site three metres down the river. Work on the generator took place when the Swiss erector was in the village to install the ropeway. The owner used the same makeshift connection and, although power output increased by a small margin, the vibration was not permanently eliminated. These problems with the generator diverted focus from and disrupted ropeway erection activities and required the Swiss expert to make an additional, expensive return trip.
The ropeway used daytime power as it operated continuously from 10 AM to 5 PM. The ropeway motor consumed 12 kW once it was running (and about 18 kW to start up). This new demand significantly increased the plant factor—over its capacity, in fact. Since the plant produced only about 30 kW and supplying power to the ropeway cut, the supply of power to households and other small enterprises, including the bakery, during the day. Only a mill and households in Ward No. 7 received electricity. The supply and demand relationship became unsatisfactory. Although the ropeway had been installed on the condition that the MHP owner would build a second plant so that sufficient power would be available, Bir Bahadur was unable to do so.
Technological: Problems with the line design led to insufficient tension in the cable, which, in turn, resulted in the reduction of its carrying capacity from 300 to just 150 kilogrammes. Consequently, the performance and resultant income from the ropeway declined. Another challenge was the location of the drive station in an area with unstable slopes. After a geo-technical investigation of the drive station area commissioned by ITDG-Nepal, it was recommended that NGDG take slope stabilisation measures before the onset of the monsoon. These measures included improving the drainage on the sidewall and providing gabion support below the drive station; the measures were not, however, implemented. The RMC did participate, but either its members did not understand how urgent these steps were we failed to impress upon them their responsibility. Thus, neither RMC nor NGDG took action when major funding was on offer from the British Embassy. Because the RMC did not mobilise the local contributions upon which support was conditional it received no money.
The plan to upgrade the payload capacity of the system by increasing the height of the cable did not take place for the same reason. When Gottfried Rohrer viewed Barpak Ropeway in early 1999 he was perturbed to find that the operating conditions were poor. 12 The hauling cable was completely dry because lubricant had not been applied for a long time and the cable touched the ground at one point. He attributed these lapses to negligence on the part of the management. As soon as this information was received, at ITDG’s initiative, a meeting was held at ITDG-Nepal’s Kathmandu office with key persons of the RMC in order to address the problems that Rohrer had identified. A work plan was prepared and responsibility divided, but the committee members did not follow up on their responsibilities. Since ITDG-Nepal did not own the Barpak Ropeway and only served in an advisory capacity, it withdrew from engagement with the ropeway venture shortly thereafter.
Managerial: Poor management and coordination during construction led to delays. NGDG was not able to provide the 10 per cent of the total costs in the form of local contributions in kind (local materials and labour) that it had committed itself to. It could only manage to contribute about three per cent. NGDG was relying totally on paid labour when I reached Barpak in December 1997. I persuaded Bir Bahadur to raise additional cash. With his salesmanship skills he raised about Rs 400,000 for further investment in the project, most of it remittances from overseas Barpakis.
Though it was made clear that the ropeway was not meant for people and a signboard at the driving stations declared that the movement of people was prohibited, Barpak Ropeway was, in fact, used as a passenger ropeway. The management could not stop people from travelling on the ropeway and even fixed the price at one rupee per kilogramme of body weight. On 7 May, 1999, the hauling rope of the ropeway snapped and four people travelling on the ropeway were killed.
REFLECTING ON THE EXPERIENCE
This ropeway was a pilot venture from which lessons must be drawn so that future efforts in this direction are more sustainable. Many organisations and individuals supported the ropeway; but many of the assumptions and values of these well-meaning supporters demand review and reassessment.13 They include: the cost-reducing approach favoured by many technical NGOs such as ITDG-Nepal; management difficulties characteristic of a society unused to this new technology; and issues of coordination among development partners. The experience at Barpak provides an opportunity to openly assess successes and failures.
Drudgery reduction: The Rangrung to Barpak was stretch a suitable site. Barpak is a large mountain village with a populated hinterland which provided sufficient demand. In one day as many as 28 trips were made. The ropeway was an effective end-use of the MHP. It demonstrated the best use of electric power: saving about 450 hours of labour each day using only 12 kW.14 However, the actual condition of the power plant needed a more thorough appraisal.
Appropriate technology: Building a road would have cost Rs 24 million and agricultural land would have been lost. In addition, it would have increased reliance on imported diesel and contributed to pollution. The environmental consequences due to landslides would have made maintenance very costly. A ropeway, in contrast, is cheap to maintain and environmentally friendly; besides, it uses locally-generated electricity. This, of course, is true in theory: in practice, inculcating a proper maintenance culture in a community, which has never used such an artefact, is the equivalent of a project by itself. Promoters of ropeways need to be aware of this painful reality.
Cost reduction: To reduce costs, a reliable second-hand ropeway system in good condition was procured, the involvement of expatriate experts minimised, a local construction contractor employed, locally-built pylons used and the community involved. The complete 2.5-kilometre ropeway system with six pylons weighing about 10 tonnes cost one million rupees. Four pylons were fabricated locally as per the original sample and additional cable was purchased from Spain. Unfortunately, cost minimising measures can sometimes result in compromises that can revisit the project later and increase its overall cost. This happened in Barpak with civil works and transportation.
Communications: Good communication among working partners is important. All was fine until August 1997, when work on site began and communication gaps developed. After much effort these gaps were repaired and the revised target met. One serious consequence of this communication gap involved power production.15 The plant owner was the main person in the community responsible for coordinating with Himal Hydro, the Swiss erector and ITDG-Nepal; but the fact that his attention was divided between the powerhouse and the ropeway had a detrimental effect on project coordination. Until the short-haul ropeway industry in Nepal grows more mature and until wider usage of ropeways in rural Nepal gives birth to more local experience in a wide range of areas, pilot projects should not substitute a novice user group for an experienced, full-time manager.
Field implementation: The absence of clear coordination increased costs. The guide wire locations had to be relocated as they were inadvertently erected in the wrong places. Similarly, cost increased because, after landslides undermined initial efforts, more concrete work was needed to accommodate the drive station in two different sites. In the field, poor progress in civil construction and the relocation of the powerhouse at the time of the Swiss erector’s visit hampered installation. His visit itself had to be organised twice as the required preparation during his first visit was far from adequate. Ten helicopter trips instead of five were required to carry the cable drums from Gorkha to Barpak because only low capacity helicopters were available. Himal Hydro, a regular client of helicopter companies, subsequently said they could easily have negotiated a better price if NGDG had asked for assistance.
Skills transfer and capacity building: Even though Himal Hydro is an experienced company, it was its first experience working on a community project in a remote area. Himal Hydro depended on the local community for its unskilled workforc, and transferring basic construction skills to the community turned out to be a more complex task than it had envisaged.
LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
While it functioned till May, 1999, the Barpak Ropeway served the mountain settlement well: it reduced drudgery and saved time. It also diversified the enduse of the Barpak MHP and improved its plant factor. It also provided very limited local employment. Finally, the experience at Barpak provided many lessons, some of which are:
The Barpak experience has established that rural ropeways are appropriate for easing the hardship of carrying goods up steep hills where there is a large population (more than 5,000) to serve. Its other benefits include savings in time, easy access to goods and economic incentives. Although a ropeway is cheaper than a road, initial investment costs are still prohibitively high for many local communities and pose an obstacle to the widespread proliferation of the ropeway without sensitive, ameliorating government policies.
Taking a capacity-building rather than a project approach can bring down the cost of a ropeway if done with flexibility and sensitivity. Indigenous capacity building in the fields of MHP and suspension bridges over the last 30 years provides a model for the approach to pursue in ropeway development.
Local units of self-governance such as DDCs and VDCs should be made partners and be involved in all stages of a project, right from the outset— identifying where they should be built and how much the users should pay for services. Relying on a single charismatic leader to carry out a community project has its benefits but is also risky. The process of community mobilisation and institution building must be initiated as a precondition to initiating a community project.
Agencies which promote community ropeways must be prepared for the unpredictability and lack of professionalism that is inevitable when a community is a partner. The inherent risks require contingency plans, particularly in relation to backstopping support. Support must be provided in terms of technical information, operation and maintenance, and management.
Involving local people in the construction and management of the Barpak Ropeway meant that skills were transferred to them. In the process, community confidence was built. But in this case there was constant dissatisfaction, particularly in communication and coordination among the Swiss erector, the local company and the construction committee. Smooth cooperation among actors in a ropeway project is a requisite. This can be achieved by clarifying roles and responsibilities at the outset, which involves significant investment of time in community interactions.
The level of local expertise available for the design and construction of ropeway works is inadequate. It needs to be developed through working
Taking a capacity-building rather than a project approach can bring down the cost of a ropeway if done with flexibility and sensitivity. Indigenous capacity building in the fields of MHP and suspension bridges over the last 30 years provides a model for the approach to pursue in ropeway development.
Local units of self-governance such as DDCs and VDCs should be made partners and be involved in all stages of a project, right from the outset— identifying where they should be built and how much the users should pay for services. Relying on a single charismatic leader to carry out a community project has its benefits but is also risky. The process of community mobilisation and institution building must be initiated as a precondition to initiating a community project.
Agencies which promote community ropeways must be prepared for the unpredictability and lack of professionalism that is inevitable when a community is a partner. The inherent risks require contingency plans, particularly in relation to backstopping support. Support must be provided in terms of technical information, operation and maintenance, and management.
Involving local people in the construction and management of the Barpak Ropeway meant that skills were transferred to them. In the process, community confidence was built. But in this case there was constant dissatisfaction, particularly in communication and coordination among the Swiss erector, the local company and the construction committee. Smooth cooperation among actors in a ropeway project is a requisite. This can be achieved by clarifying roles and responsibilities at the outset, which involves significant investment of time in community interactions.
The level of local expertise available for the design and construction of ropeway works is inadequate. It needs to be developed through working
with expatriate specialists. Once local capacity is established, as happened with suspension bridges over the last three or four decades, the role of expatriate experts can be reduced.
� A clear agreement on the purchase of power and the penalties of default should be drawn up between the ropeway operator and the power plant to an ensure that there is an adequate supply of power.
Geographical factors and high costs do not allow Nepal to contemplate connecting all its hill and mountain settlements by roads. Settlements can, however, be connected with low-cost, environmentally friendly material ropeways. The Barpak Ropeway showed that this was indeed a possibility. Although several factors helped to bring this intervention to fruition, the Ropeway still failed. Its collapse can be attributed to two main reasons. First, since it was not designed to transport passengers, its factor of safety was so low that any accident would be fatal. That people used a ropeway not designed to ferry passengers reflects a lack of technological discipline and weak regulation. Second, given the severe impact of cloudbursts and floods, the local capacity to design and build adequate towers and foundations needs to be developed further. In this particular case, the suitability of the sites for locating the stations was not adequately assessed. The employment of local expertise can help reduce costs but caution is warranted.
NOTES
1 The plant factor is the ratio of energy used to the total energy the plant could produce at full capac¬ity. Load factor is the ratio of the total energy used to the energy that would be produced if the plant operated at peak demand continuously throughout the year.
2 The first Nepali recipient of the Swiss ‘Rolex Award for Enterprise’ for developing the multipurpose power unit (MPPU) in 1984.
3 A small Pelton turbine coupled with an induction generator with a single shaft to produce 1-3 kW of electric power from small streams. More than 1,000 of these have been installed in Nepal so far.
4 KMTNC (King Mahendra Trust for Nature Conservation), an environmental protection organisation man¬dated by an Act of Parliament. Annapurna Conservation Area Project (ACAP) began in 1986 with the objective of strengthening linkages between ethics, economics and environment by looking at local communities as both the principle actors and the beneficiaries of conservation undertakings.
5 See Poudel (1997).
6 See ITDG-Nepal (1995).
7 Rohrer arranged for a senior Swiss erector to install the electromechanical equipment and test the ropeway’s commissioning.
8 See NGDG (2055 BS).
9 Upon completion of the project, two studies were conducted. One, entitled ‘A Socio-economic Impact Assessment of the Ropeway in Barpak’ was conducted by a student of the Imperial College of Science and Technology, London, for her M.S. thesis and the other, ‘Rangrung-Barpak Ropeway Project Report’ was undertaken by NGDG, Gorkha. The figures discussed in the given two reports.
10 Although Bir Bahadur did not agree to be a member of the RMC, he was instrumental in convincing prominent Barpakis to serve as the chairperson and members of the committee.
11 See Earth Consult Pvt. Ltd. (2000).
12 At his own initiative while he was in Nepal on another assignment to carry out preliminary survey for a private cement industry.
13 Which includes moral support by Toni Hagen, who, waiving five person-weeks of communication, came to Kathmandu with the shipping documents of the dispatch from Switzerland, and advisory support services from Switzerland by Gottfried Rohrer.
14 The reduction in payload capacity decreased the power requirement to some extent. The use of a capacitor bank provided the cushion for the higher initial starting current the motor required.
15 During my visit to Barpak in December, I found that the distribution voltage had dropped as low as 150 V.
REFERENCES
Earth Consult, 2000: A Case Study of Rangrung-Barpak Ropeway, A report submitted to ITDG-Nepal, Earth Consult (Pvt.) Ltd., Kathmandu.
ITDG, 1995: A Baseline Study of Barpak by Simkhada, Urmila, ITDG-Nepal, Kathmandu.
NGDG, 2055: Rangrung-Barpak Ropeway Pariyojana Pratibedan, (In Nepali: a report on Rangrung-Barpak Project) Northern Gorkha Development Group, Barpak, Gorkha.
Poudel, R., 1997: Pre-Investment Study on the Proposed Rangrung-Barpak Ropeway, ITDG, p. 12, March, Kathmandu
� A clear agreement on the purchase of power and the penalties of default should be drawn up between the ropeway operator and the power plant to an ensure that there is an adequate supply of power.
Geographical factors and high costs do not allow Nepal to contemplate connecting all its hill and mountain settlements by roads. Settlements can, however, be connected with low-cost, environmentally friendly material ropeways. The Barpak Ropeway showed that this was indeed a possibility. Although several factors helped to bring this intervention to fruition, the Ropeway still failed. Its collapse can be attributed to two main reasons. First, since it was not designed to transport passengers, its factor of safety was so low that any accident would be fatal. That people used a ropeway not designed to ferry passengers reflects a lack of technological discipline and weak regulation. Second, given the severe impact of cloudbursts and floods, the local capacity to design and build adequate towers and foundations needs to be developed further. In this particular case, the suitability of the sites for locating the stations was not adequately assessed. The employment of local expertise can help reduce costs but caution is warranted.
NOTES
1 The plant factor is the ratio of energy used to the total energy the plant could produce at full capac¬ity. Load factor is the ratio of the total energy used to the energy that would be produced if the plant operated at peak demand continuously throughout the year.
2 The first Nepali recipient of the Swiss ‘Rolex Award for Enterprise’ for developing the multipurpose power unit (MPPU) in 1984.
3 A small Pelton turbine coupled with an induction generator with a single shaft to produce 1-3 kW of electric power from small streams. More than 1,000 of these have been installed in Nepal so far.
4 KMTNC (King Mahendra Trust for Nature Conservation), an environmental protection organisation man¬dated by an Act of Parliament. Annapurna Conservation Area Project (ACAP) began in 1986 with the objective of strengthening linkages between ethics, economics and environment by looking at local communities as both the principle actors and the beneficiaries of conservation undertakings.
5 See Poudel (1997).
6 See ITDG-Nepal (1995).
7 Rohrer arranged for a senior Swiss erector to install the electromechanical equipment and test the ropeway’s commissioning.
8 See NGDG (2055 BS).
9 Upon completion of the project, two studies were conducted. One, entitled ‘A Socio-economic Impact Assessment of the Ropeway in Barpak’ was conducted by a student of the Imperial College of Science and Technology, London, for her M.S. thesis and the other, ‘Rangrung-Barpak Ropeway Project Report’ was undertaken by NGDG, Gorkha. The figures discussed in the given two reports.
10 Although Bir Bahadur did not agree to be a member of the RMC, he was instrumental in convincing prominent Barpakis to serve as the chairperson and members of the committee.
11 See Earth Consult Pvt. Ltd. (2000).
12 At his own initiative while he was in Nepal on another assignment to carry out preliminary survey for a private cement industry.
13 Which includes moral support by Toni Hagen, who, waiving five person-weeks of communication, came to Kathmandu with the shipping documents of the dispatch from Switzerland, and advisory support services from Switzerland by Gottfried Rohrer.
14 The reduction in payload capacity decreased the power requirement to some extent. The use of a capacitor bank provided the cushion for the higher initial starting current the motor required.
15 During my visit to Barpak in December, I found that the distribution voltage had dropped as low as 150 V.
REFERENCES
Earth Consult, 2000: A Case Study of Rangrung-Barpak Ropeway, A report submitted to ITDG-Nepal, Earth Consult (Pvt.) Ltd., Kathmandu.
ITDG, 1995: A Baseline Study of Barpak by Simkhada, Urmila, ITDG-Nepal, Kathmandu.
NGDG, 2055: Rangrung-Barpak Ropeway Pariyojana Pratibedan, (In Nepali: a report on Rangrung-Barpak Project) Northern Gorkha Development Group, Barpak, Gorkha.
Poudel, R., 1997: Pre-Investment Study on the Proposed Rangrung-Barpak Ropeway, ITDG, p. 12, March, Kathmandu
Source: Ropeway in Nepal
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