Why did the individuals responsible for tourist development in Nepal make such harmful and irreversible mistakes as building roads to the panoramic mountains around Kathmandu and Pokhara? Why do they continue to make these same mistakes today? Why are roads preferred for opening high mountain valleys such as Thak Khola when aerial ropeways would be cheaper to build and maintain since they would be much less vulnerable to natural disasters like floods and landslides? Why is Nepal dominated by regimes that are obsessed with a road mania?
Part of the answer is certainly the fact that, for big donors, whether international or bilateral, modern road construction is good business: up to 90 per cent of the money invested returns to the donor. An example is the high-tech project implemented to stabilise the landslide on the Jiri Road at a cost of over eight million SFr. Another main reason for the unfortunate prevalence of a wrong notion about transport development is that none of those responsible have so far taken pains to study alpine hill tourism beginning with its fundamentals and to learn from that study. Instead, they only visit incestuous international tourist conferences with hackneyed themes in places like Berlin, London or Paris, where the same people make the same statements again and again, reinforcing their own and each other’s views. They may thus make themselves happy, but they do not make any contribution to proper tourism development or to the happiness of the marginalised poor in the Himalaya.
Moving from Stagnation to Change in Nepal’s Policy Environment
SURENDRA LAL SHRESTHA
Nepal’s scenic terrain is a transporter’s nightmare. Its hills and mountains, which comprise about two-thirds of the country’s area, are criss-crossed by rivers that flow through gorges, churn in rapids and create waterfalls. The steep slopes and valleys associated with river formation severely hamper the movement of people and goods from one location to another. Many of Nepal’s mountainous districts are still inaccessible by road; they are classified as ‘durgam kshetra’or ‘remote areas’. Given how weak the country’s economy is, roads serving these areas will not be constructed for quite some time. More than half of the country’s population still lives in the mountains and hills (Table 2.1). Though this ratio is expected to decline in the years ahead as more people migrate to the Tarai and to urban areas, those that remain behind will still need a transportation system of some sort.
Because hill settlements are scattered and comprise just a few hamlets with a dozen or so households each, the task of providing transportation services is daunting.
TABLE 2.1 Populations and their political representation by geographical region
The numbers in parenthesis are percentages. Source: CBS, 1991 and 2001 and Election Commission, 2001
If one considers that Nepal has 2,418 village development committees (VDCs) in the hills, each with nine wards, which may, in turn, include several scattered hamlets, it is clear that the cost of developing transportation facilities is prohibitively expensive. Nevertheless, it is the state’s responsibility to meet the aspirations of the people who live in remote areas to be better provided with modern services, including transportation, which makes access to all other services possible. If local economies are to improve and poverty is to be alleviated, then local communities must be provided with access to markets. Modes of transport that are cost effective and suited to specific areas are essential, and government policies must facilitate their realisation if the national goals of social and economic upliftment are to be fulfilled. In Nepal, roads, though much needed, are not universally feasible; in their stead, ropeways, if properly planned, can facilitate access to even the remotest of hill hamlets.
TRANSPORT SECTOR IN NATIONAL PLANS
When the Rana regime was overthrown in 1951, Nepal’s entire transport system consisted of 376 kilometres of motorable roads, one airport, 100 kilometres of narrow-gauged railway line connecting Janakpur with Jayanagar in India and Raxaul with Amlekhgunj, and 22 kilometres of mono-cable ropeway that transported cargo from Dhorshing to Matatirtha in Kathmandu. Today, Nepal has more than fifteen thousand kilometres of motorable roads aligned north-south as well as east-west to connect various parts of the country. Forty-three airports have been built and Kathmandu’s international airport handles wide-bodied jets.
In contrast, growth in other modes of transport has been negligible. The extent of ropeway development for instance, has been limited to the institution of a now defunct 42-kilometre bi-cable cargo line from Hetauda to Kathmandu, a three-kilometre ropeway in Bhattedanda and a three-kilometre passenger cable car line to Manakamana. From 100 kilometres, the length of railway line dropped to 53 kilometres when the Raxaul-Amlekhgunj line fell into disuse. Also during those fifty years an electric trolley bus system was installed to operate along the 13-kilometre stretch between Tripureswar in Kathmandu, and Surya Binayak in Bhaktapur. Inland navigation in Nepal is limited to ferries and dugout canoes which are used only along certain stretches of the Kosi, Narayani and Karnali rivers. None of these transport systems are mentioned in the transport sector of Nepal’s National Five-Year Plans. The achievements of the transport sector over the last five decades are shown in Table 2.2.
When Nepal first promulgated centralised development planning as its state policy in 1956, attention was turned toward improving transportation facilities. As Table 2.3 shows, the First National Plan allocated the bulk of the government’s resources to the transport sector and accorded the implementation of its activities top priority.
+++
* Collected by DoR for first eight months. Manakamana-Kurintar (3.02 km) and Jhankridanda-Bhattedanda (3.01 km). C ceased to operate but
** This figure is estimated based on the trail map prepared physical system has not been dismantled andby the Trail Improvement Programme.
theoretically can be restarted. The list does not
+
A: Dhorshing-Matatirtha (22 km) and include industrial and construction ropeways. The
B: Halchok-Lainchaur (4 km). industrial ropeways are at cement factories in Hetauda (see Chapter 7) and Udaipur. Another
++ C: A is replaced and extended by Hetauda-Kathmandu industrial ropeway to transport magnesite did not(42 km), B ceased to operate.
function (see Chapter 3).
Sources: Periodic plans and progress reports of NPC Nepal: Economic Survey FY 2001/02, Ministry of Finance 2002, Nepal; Department of Roads; Suspension Bridge Division, Main Trail Bridge Statistics, 1997 Nepal
* As reflected in the Tenth Plan Approach Paper, NPC/ HMG/N, 2002 Source: National Planning Commission, HMG/Nepal, First to Tenth, National Development Plans Nepal
The Third Five-Year Plan allocated the highest proportion of public sector resources (50 per cent) to developing transport and communication infrastructure. Since then the share of budgetary allocation has declined steadily. With the exception of the Seventh Five-Year Plan, which earmarked a relatively high proportion—29 per cent—other plans allocated less than a fifth of their budgets to the transport sector. The Ninth Five-Year Plan, for example, budgeted only 17 per cent and the Tenth Five-Year Plan about 16 per cent. The actual expenditure on developing various modes of transport from the Fifth Five-Year Plan period through the first three years of the Ninth Five-Year Plan period is presented in Table 2.4.
Within the transport sector, the highest priority—between 73 and 83 per cent of total expenditures—has been consistently given to developing roads. Civil aviation has taken up the next largest share, constituting between 11 and 18 per cent. The expenditure on all other modes of transport was less than one per cent of the total amount. Ropeways, which are included under ‘other modes,’ have received little attention. After the restoration of multi-party democracy in 1990, during a ‘plan holiday’ period (1991-1992), about 20 per cent was spent on the transport sector. Expenditure on ‘other modes’ of transport was only about 0.5 per cent.
In the 1950s, Nepal had virtually no modern transport facilities, and the little there was, was limited to Kathmandu and a few other cities. As transport infrastructure (particularly road and civil aviation) has expanded over the past five decades, so has the import of petroleum-based fuel. Unfortunately, ropeways and electric railways, which could have been operated using locally-generated hydropower, received little
Numbers in parentheses are percentages Source: Economic Survey, Ministry of Finance, 1998/99
* First three years expenditure only + Includes bridges
priority. Furthermore, existing ‘other modes’ deteriorated due to the lack of government support and poor operation and maintenance. During the Ninth Five-Year Plan period, three ropeways, one each in Bhattedanda, Barpak and Kurintar, were built. The Manakamana Ropeway was built by the private sector; it is the only people carrier operating in the country. The government wrote off the services of the Nepal Ropeway (NR) in the last year of the Ninth Five-Year Plan period. A few months later the electrically-operated trolley bus between Bhaktapur and Kathmandu also stopped running. It was revived in October 2003 and now operates along a three-kilometre section between Tripureswar and Koteswar.
The completion of the Birgunj-Hetauda section of the Tribhuban Highway created competition for the Raxaul-Amlekhgunj Railway, which gradually fell into disuse. Road transport has, among other benefits, the advantage of enabling trucks to deliver consignments to the doors of dealers. Due to the additional loading and unloading costs that shipment by rail entails, the railway could not compete.
In the list of demands for development projects that local representatives put forward, roads are often at the top: local populations clearly aspire to improve access to their villages. Despite the dramatic extension of roads accomplished by the Five-Year Plans, many rural areas are still without access. The present level of growth in road construction, however, cannot meet the existing and latent demand for improved access, and civil aviation will provide too little support. Besides, though both these modes of transport ease the movement of people and materials, the country’s poverty makes the problem of finding adequate resources a major hurdle.
One major challenge is the maintenance of completed roads. Another is improving their economic viability. Because the volume of traffic is low—less than 200 to 300 vehicles per day—most hill roads are economically unproductive; their under-utilisation makes them a liability rather than an asset. To make a road productive, movement on it must be increased; to do that a road must meet the demands of not only rural communities but also of other sectors of the economy. For example, the development of a feeder road system connected with a network of farm roads could help increase the area of influence of a highway and thereby promote its economic viability. Though being able to afford the cost of maintenance and rehabilitation is a challenge, more traffic would generate more revenue and thereby meet a greater proportion of maintenance costs.
This concept has gained acceptance and a programme of constructing feeder and district roads has been implemented since 1990. As a consequence, the total length of feeder and district roads increased by 10 and 34 per cent respectively from 1990 to 1998. The ratio of national highways to feeder/district roads was 1:1.95 in 1990, but rose to 1:2.91 in 1998, as shown in Table 2.5. Fifty-one feeder roads now
FIGURE 2.1
Road network in Nepal
N
A
Biratnagar
Source: DoR (1995)
* According to the Economic Survey (2004) the total length of Source: DoR Nepal Road Statistics, NRS, 2000 roads in Nepal is 16,042 kilometres.
connect different highways in the kingdom (DoR, 1995). Major road networks are shown in Figure 2.1.
Despite the promise of a feeder road system, limitations exist. If road systems branching out from main highways are insufficiently developed, feeder roads cannot generate enough traffic to be self-sustaining. Because the alignments of village roads are set according to political pressures rather than economic rationality, they are often inappropriately laid, insufficiently travelled and cost ineffective. In addition, the construction of these roads has not been environmentally friendly.
Green road technology has been adopted very recently as a major innovation in Himalayan road building. Green roads are built without using heavy equipment or blasting. Instead, they use labour-intensive methods to widen a road over a four-year periods: after a track is opened, trees and other vegetation are planted and retention walls are built at strategic points. Cut material is used for filling rather than being dumping over the side. The objective is to stabilise slopes naturally. Green roads include the Tansen-Arghakhanchi and the Arya Bhanjyang-Rampur roads in Palpa District, the Dhading-Malekhu Road in Dhading District and the Galyan-Chapakot Road in Syanja District. Some green roads have been implemented with donor assistance. The German government built two: the 52-kilometre Besi-Salyantar-Sanetar and the 24kilometre Bhimdhunga-Lamidanda roads in Dhading District (GTZ, 1991). The Swiss have helped in Palpa. These roads have met the transport needs of hinterland areas although the green approach to road building places limitations on the type of vehicles which can be used and the loads they can carry. Low-cost green roads are ideally open to traffic only in the dry season and heavy loads are debarred. Failure to impose these regulations results in an astronomic rise in maintenance costs.
In the Ninth Five-Year Plan period, HMG/N created the DoLIDAR under the Ministry of Local Development (MLD) in order to promote rural roads and thereby agriculture development. Linking rural agriculture roads to feeder roads, district roads and national highways are expected to increase the density of traffic on existing roads.
In the past, the national transportation development policy did not take into consideration all modes of transport. Instead, it was biased towards promoting road and air transportation systems. The implementation of green roads combined with local ropeway development would be an exciting new approach. In addition, the development of ropeways can be planned to complement roads and airports and thereby reduce the cost of developing the overall transport infrastructure. A ropeway is a viable alternative to a road if one compares their financial and environmental costs. Ropeways can make use of roads or even airfields and helipads which have already been constructed in remote areas. Ropeways (simple, short, valley-bottomto-ridge-top type) can promote agriculture, forestry, dairy farming, mining, cottage and small-scale industry and local tourism.
As a result of an institutional gap, the ropeway as an alternative mode of transportation was not pursued in Nepal in the past. There is no separate department with responsibility for developing ropeways and railways, and the unit in the Ministry of Works and Transport (MoWT) which was assigned this task was ineffective in putting forth any programmes to develop these alternatives. The potential for ropeways is high, though it must be borne in mind that a ropeway transport system would require a very different approach from that used in the past. The following sections discuss why the past approaches led nowhere and what a new planning approach might look like.
NATIONAL PLANS AND POLICIES FOR ROPEWAY
Since ropeway transport can make a positive contribution to rural economies, previous national development plans, particularly those from the Fifth Five-Year Plan onwards, incorporated policies and programmes for improving and extending the existing ropeway services. With grant assistance from the US government, the old 22-kilometrelong, low-capacity mono-cable system operating between Dhorshing and Kathmandu was replaced and extended during the Second Five-Year Plan period with a 42kilometre-long bi-cable ropeway operating between Hetauda and Kathmandu. The ropeway was owned by HMG/N and operated by NR under the parastatal Nepal Transport Corporation (NTC). No other ropeway lines were introduced although some repair and maintenance as well as rehabilitation work was undertaken.
The Sixth Five-Year Plan proposed developing gravity ropeways in the hills and mountains in order to transport daily necessities. The plan also aimed to initiate arrangements for constructing the Surkhet-Dailekh section of the proposed Surkhet-Jumla Ropeway. Restoring the original carrying capacity of the NR was also mentioned. Although six million rupees was allocated for ropeway development, nothing except the strengthening of the NR happened. The Surkhet-Dailekh Ropeway could not be constructed for two reasons: there was neither a reliable supply of electricity nor any donor assistance.
The Seventh Five-Year Plan also included a programme for developing ropeways and specified policies for building gravity ropeways. This programme aimed to involve private entrepreneurs in ropeway development. However, no tangible achievement was made during this plan period either, other than that some money was spent on the routine maintenance of the NR.
The Eighth Five-Year Plan, which came with the restoration of multi-party democracy, included a programme for developing ropeways under the sub-sector ‘other modes of transport’. The Plan’s ropeway development policy stated that existing ropeways would be consolidated and operated at full capacity, that the private sector would be encouraged to develop short-haul ropeways for promoting tourism and that the public would be mobilised in developing gravity ropeways. The Plan’s objective was to develop a ropeway system in line with the overall objectives and policies of the transport sector. Programmes such as the construction of the Surkhet-Jumla Ropeway, the installation of gravity ropeways on an experimental basis and the consolidation and renovation of the NR were included. For these purposes the Plan allocated 158 million rupees. A study of Surkhet-Jumla Ropeway was carried out but it did not go beyond that. Some investments in renovating the NR, which was still operating then, were made, but the installation of gravity ropeways was not initiated.
The Ninth Five-Year Plan included a policy for developing ropeway transport systems which would support tourism with private sector involvement. The Plan was committed to a twenty year National Transport Master Plan that included a cable car/ropeway development programme. It stated that actions would be initiated to privatise the NR so that it could be operated more effectively. During the first three years of the planning period, the NR was repaired and maintained. At the same time, a high-level committee in the MoWT was constituted to see to its privatisation. An environmental impact assessment (EIA) study of the Birethanti-Jomsom Cable Car Ropeway was approved and the three-kilometre-long Manakamana Cable Car was completed by the private sector. The government also granted permission to the private sector to construct and operate a cable car in Sworgadwari, Pyuthan District. Nevertheless, no substantial achievements were made regarding these pronouncements.
The approach paper of the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2002-2007) states that policies for developing ropeway transportation will be adopted. The Plan aims to encourage private entrepreneurs to construct and operate cable car/ropeways in places with importance for tourist and local economies where road access is lacking. The Plan mentions that priority for cable car/ropeway development would be accorded to those areas where the cost of constructing and operating roads would be comparatively high.
In sum, though policies and modest-scale programmes were incorporated in Nepal’s Five-Year Plans, ropeway development has remained stagnant over the last four decades. Its potential to become an important segment of the country’s transport system has not been realised.
POLITICAL PARTIES AND THEIR THINKING ON ROPEWAYS
The restoration of multi-party democracy in 1990 brought political parties espousing various ideologies into the mainstream; and it is enlightening to compare the commitments articulated by various political parties regarding ropeways. Since 1990, the country has held three general elections (in 1991, 1995 and 1999). A fourth one, a mid-term poll, was to be held in November 2002 but was postponed due to the Maoist insurgency. In the last twelve years, all major political parties—the Nepali Congress (NC), the Communist Party of Nepal United Marxist-Leninist (CPN/UML), the Rashtriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) and the Nepal Sadbhavana Party (NSP)—have had a stint in the government singly or in various coalitions. Since 1991, political parties have suffered internal polarisation and some have even split. The CPN (United Marxist Leninist), for example split into the CPN (UML) and the CPN (Marxist-Leninist), which went their separate ways but re-united with a smaller dissident faction still remaining separate. The RPP separated into the Thapa and Chand factions but the rift has since outwardly healed. The split of the Nepali Congress party still exists; Girija Prasad Koirala and Sher Bahadur Deuba lead the two factions. The NSP has also split into two factions.
All political parties agree that progress in transportation is essential for the country’s overall development and all emphasise this need in their respective manifestos. However, only a few political parties call for the improvement and extension of existing ropeways. In its manifesto of 1991, the CPN (UML) committed itself to extending ropeway service with the electrification of hill settlements. Four years later, in its election manifesto of 1995, it claimed that ‘the existing operation of railway, ropeway and trolley bus services will be improved, renovated and extended’. While the NC mentioned nothing specific about the development of ropeways in its election manifesto of 1991, it did promise to develop electric-powered transport services such as trolley buses and railways in feasible locations. This commitment was also reiterated in the party’s manifesto of 1995. The manifesto of the Nepal Majdoor Kisan Party (NMKP) mentioned its commitment to developing ropeway transport in remote parts of the country where the construction of roads could take time. The RPP did not mention ropeway development at all.
National-level political parties seem to feel that ropeway development is necessary and, at least in theory, accord priority to its development using electric power obtained from locally available hydropower resources in the hills. The reality, however, is different. No political party in power has translated commitments on paper into action. In fact, when the operation of the trolley bus ceased, no political party—neither those in power nor those on the opposition bench—showed any concern.
The political instability characterising the post-1990 framework is one of the primary reasons the condition of existing ropeways has deteriorated and the development of this mode of transport has failed to progress. Another factor has been the lack of pressure from district-level functionaries. For example, District Development Committees (DDCs) have never put forward proposals for developing ropeways; they have been more concerned about building roads and bridges. In addition, the majority of hill people and communities have not seen the benefits that could accrue from ropeways: they have not been shown examples of successful ropeways that could ease their problems in terms of transporting goods. Local communities, concerned agencies and entrepreneurs are unaware of the success of Manakamana Cable Car and the Bhattedanda Ropeway. The Barpak Ropeway was also successfully operated for fourteen months before its hauling cable snapped. Though it may take time, promoting mass awareness about the benefits of ropeways must be pursued with zeal.
CONCLUSION
Communities in the hills and mountains of Nepal must be provided with easy and affordable transport systems that provide them access to the larger market. Ropeways should become one more component of broad-based rural transport systems comprising trails, suspension bridges and unmetalled and green roads. Short haulage ropeways can complement rural transport systems by meeting local transport needs at affordable costs. Ropeways are end-use opportunities which can improve the performance of MHPs.
In fact, the spread of decentralised micro-hydropower to remote areas provides a suitable environment for developing ropeways as well as for reducing the use of imported petroleum fuels. Ropeways have fewer detrimental impacts on local environments than roads do. Ropeway development not only supports hydropower but it can also be linked to the development of suspension bridges.
In this connection, it is instructive to examine the place and an implementation of suspension bridges in Nepal’s Five-Year Plans . Although building bridges to cross deep river gorges started in the First Five-Year Plan itself, this programme was pursued vigorously with specific targets from the Second Five-Year Plan onwards. From a target of 30 bridges then, it reached a target of 400 in the Ninth Five-Year Plan. The central Suspension Bridge Division (SBD) constructed 495 suspension bridges between 1964 and 1999 while the decentralised Bridge Building at the Local Level (BBLL) programme constructed 644 suspension bridges between 1989 and 2000 (Joshi et al., 2003). Besides BBLL and SBD, many other agencies are also involved in building suspension bridges. As of 2001, a total of 2,487 trail bridges had been constructed in 61 districts across the country (Helvetas, 2001). The cost per metre of span for a community bridge (CB) and for a long-span trail bridge (LSTB) were about Rs 13,500 and Rs 27,000 respectively. The material costs of a LSTB, including the steel cable and components, were about 40 per cent of the total costs, whereas for CB they constituted 38 per cent. Transportation and construction costs for LSTB was 48 per cent of the total costs, whereas for a CB it was just 23 per cent. Technical engineering support cost two and four per cent of the respective totals. Labour during installation, both skilled and unskilled, constitutes about 35 per cent of the cost of a CB (Helvetas, 2002).
The government must begin promoting ropeways with at least as much emphasis as it has placed on suspension bridges and MHPs. To support the development of micro-hydropower programmes, for example, institutional arrangements such as the Alternative Energy Promotion Centre (AEPC) and the UNDP’s Rural Energy Development Programme (REDP) exist. Pilot projects with institutional innovations can provide useful insights, but at the same time, the establishment of an appropriate agency that can help private entrepreneurs and community groups to invest in ropeway development must follow. Local governments must play an important role in the initiatives; they must take a leading role in incorporating ropeways into their development plans as well as act as pressure groups on the national government.
Initiatives must be supported by appropriate policies, rules and regulations, subsidy regimes, tax incentives and credit financing, all of which will encourage Nepali and foreign investors to install ropeways. Equally important are institutional arrangements that provide support to potential entrepreneurs. The creation of infrastructure such as suspension bridges, transmission lines or micro-hydro as well as survey and engineering capabilities need to be part of any package promoting ropeways. To this end, the following suggestions about a different approach to planning rural transport in Nepal are made:
1 The government should include ropeway transport as one of its priority areas for investment. Projects that have regional or national importance must be included in Five-Year Plan documents themselves.
2 Short haulage or other types of ropeways that cater to rural communities must be accorded priority.
3 An appropriate institution that supports ropeway development needs to be established.
4 Both the private and public sector need to be involved in ropeway development.
5 Incentive packages need to clearly spell out rules and regulations that facilitate investment. If needed, donor support must be sought.
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Source: Ropeways in Nepal
The bottom station is located on the banks of Trisuli River and is 2½ hrs from Kathmandu, 2 hrs from Pokhara and 1 hour from Narayanghat. The main grand gate welcomes all to the bottom station housing the most modern cable car system. Top priority is given to safety, cleanliness & service. A revolution in Nepal’s transport & tourism field, Manakamana cable car has helped uplift the economy of Manakamana and surrounding regions.
